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
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UNIV. OF MICHIGAN

JUL 2 1912

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**SKETCH**  
**OF THE LIFE OF**  
**JOHN QUINCY ADAMS;**

TAKEN FROM THE PORT FOLIO OF APRIL, 1819.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

**THE LETTERS OF TELL:**

ORIGINALLY ADDRESSED TO THE EDITOR OF THE  
BALTIMORE AMERICAN.

*Respectfully submitted to the serious consideration of those Freeholders  
of Virginia, who desire to exercise the high privilege of  
voting for a PRESIDENT of the United States  
at the approaching Election.*

.....

1824.

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# SKETCH OF THE LIFE

## OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

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ABOUT the year 1630, a man by the name of Henry Adams came from England, with seven sons, all of whom were married. The father and one of the sons settled in the town of Braintree, about ten miles from Boston, in the then province of Massachusetts Bay. The other sons, excepting one, who returned to England, fixed their abode in several other parts of the same province. Their descendants have multiplied in the common proportion known to the experience of this country, and the name is one of those most frequently met with, in almost every part of this commonwealth. They were originally farmers and tradesmen; and until the controversies between Great Britain and the colonies arose, scarcely any of them had emerged from the obscurity in which those stations were held. Few of them before that time had possessed the advantages of education. The father of the late governor of Massachusetts, Samuel Adams, was, I believe, the first of the name distinguished in any public character. He was a merchant in Boston, and for some time a representative of that town in the general assembly of the province.

Samuel Adams, and Mr. John Q. Adams's father, John Adams, were both descended from the first Henry, but by two of the sons. They were therefore remotely connected in blood; but there is a very early incident in the life of each of them, which seems to indicate, that the *spirit of independence*, which is so strongly marked in the history of the New England colonies from their first settlement, had been largely shared by the family from which they came, and instilled with all its efficacy into their minds.

They were both educated at Harvard college, an institution founded in 1638, and thus coeval with the first settlement of the Massachusetts colony. It is the seminary from which almost every man of any eminence in our history has issued, until the establishment so much more recent of other American colleges.

Samuel Adams was many years older than Mr. John Q. Adams's father. He received his degree of master of arts at Harvard college in 1743. It was then the custom at that college, that the candidates for this degree, should each of them propose a question, having relation to any of the sciences in which they had been instructed, and assuming the affirmative or negative side of the proposition, profess to be

prepared to defend the principle contained in it, at the public commencement, against all opponents.

The question proposed by Samuel Adams was, "whether the people have a just right of *resistance*, when oppressed by their rulers," and the side which he asserted was the affirmative.

John Adams took his degree of bachelor of arts in 1755, and that of master in 1758. There has been published in the *Monthly Anthology*, a letter written by him in the year 1755, and in the twentieth year of his age; written to one of his youthful companions, Dr. Nathan Webb, and in which the probability of a severance of the British colonies from the mother country; the causes from which that event would naturally proceed, and the policy by which Britain might prevent it, are all indicated with the precision of prophecy. The date of this letter, the age at which it was written, and the standing in society of the writer at the time, are circumstances which render it remarkable; no copy of it was kept; but its contents appear to have made a strong impression upon the person to whom it was written. He carefully preserved it, and dying many years afterwards it fell into the possession of his nephew. In his hands it remained until about the year 1807; when, after the lapse of more than half a century, he sent it as a curious document, back to the writer himself.

John Q. Adams's mother's maiden name was Smith. She too is of English extraction, but her parents for three preceding generations had been natives of this country. Her father was a clergyman, and grandfather a merchant in Boston. Her mother was a daughter of *John Quincy*, who was many years a member of the provincial legislature, several times speaker of the house, and afterwards a member of the council. His name is mentioned in Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts Bay.

John Q. Adams was born at Braintree; in that part of the town which is now incorporated by the name of Quincy. The day of his birth was Saturday, July 11, 1767. The next day he was christened by the name of his great grandfather, who at the very moment when J. Q. Adams received his name, was resigning his own spirit into the hands of his Maker.

In the eleventh year of his age, Mr. Adams's father took him to France, where he was himself sent as a joint commissioner with Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee, at the court of Versailles. They sailed from Boston in February 1778, and arrived at Bordeaux in the beginning of April of the same year. Before that time J. Q. Adams's education had been that of our common schools, interrupted by the con-

vulsions of the times, but supplied by the substituted cares and attention of both his parents. His obligations to them in this respect are such as gratitude can never repay to them. The impression resulting from it upon his own mind has been that of a special duty incumbent upon him to pay the debt of the former age to that which is to succeed; and to reward his parents by transferring the same obligations to his children.

After residing about eighteen months in France, where he was successively placed at two different schools, where he learnt the language of the country, and a little Latin, he returned home with his father. Instead of three commissioners, congress had found it more expedient to keep, at the French court, a single minister. Dr. Franklin was appointed to that office; Mr. Lee had a separate commission for Spain; and Mr. Adams's father received permission to come home. They came in the French frigate, *La Sensible*, in company with the chevalier de la Luzerne, who succeeded M. Girard, as the minister of France to the United States. They arrived at Boston, August 1, 1779. The Massachusetts convention, for forming a constitution, was then just about to assemble. Mr. Adams's father was elected a member of that body, and drew the original plan of the constitution, which, with some modifications, made by the convention, was afterwards adopted, and is still the constitution of that commonwealth.

In November of the same year, 1779, the father of Mr. Adams was again sent to Europe, with a commission for negotiating peace, and a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, whenever that power should be disposed to terminate the war. He took J. Q. Adams with him again, together with his younger brother, Charles, who is since dead. They embarked at Boston in the same French frigate, *La Sensible*, then upon her return to France; she was bound to Brest; but a few days after she sailed, in a gale of wind she sprung a leak, which, in the course of a very short passage became so large, that she was obliged to make the first land she could reach in Europe, and entered the port of Ferrol, in Spain. She was unable without a thorough repair to accomplish the remainder of her voyage. Mr. Adams therefore disembarked, and travelled by land from Ferrol to Paris; where he arrived in January, 1780. J. Q. Adams was here put again to school. But in July of the same year, his father went to Holland, and took his sons with him there. They were placed first at the public city-school at Amsterdam, and afterwards at the university of Leyden. In July, 1781, Mr. Francis Dana, who had accompanied Mr. Adams's father to Europe, as secretary to the legation for negotiating peace, received a commission

from congress, as minister plenipotentiary to the empress of Russia; and J. Q. Adams went with him, as his private secretary. He was with him fourteen months at St. Petersburg, and in October, 1782, left him to return through Sweden, Denmark, Hamburg, and Bremen, to Holland, where his father had shortly before been received as minister plenipotentiary from the United States, and had concluded the commercial treaty with the republic of the United Netherlands. Upon this journey he employed the whole winter; passing several weeks at Stockholm, at Copenhagen and at Hamburg. He reached the Hague in April, 1783. His father was then at Paris, engaged in the negotiations for peace. From April until July, J. Q. Adams remained at the Hague, residing with and receiving instruction from C. W. F. Dumas, a native of Switzerland, a man of letters, who had been a zealous friend to the American cause, and then held an office as agent for the United States. In July, an interval of suspension occurred to the negotiations, during which Mr. Adams's father was called for a short time to Amsterdam; on his return to Paris, he took his eldest son with him. The definitive treaty of peace was signed September 3, 1783; from which time until May, 1785, he was chiefly with his father in England, Holland and France.

Mr. Adams was now nearly eighteen years of age; and his education, as the above detail of his wanderings about the world will show, had been rather desultory than regularly systematic; rather calculated to make him acquainted with men than with books. Hence it happened, that although he was always of a studious turn, and addicted to books beyond the bounds of moderation, yet his acquirements in literature and science were all superficial, and he did not attain so profound a knowledge of things as he could have wished. At the period of which we are now speaking, he became sensible of other inconveniences which might proceed from a longer continuance in such an unsettled course. By remaining much longer in Europe, he saw the danger of an alienation from his own country, which would disqualify him for contentment with his condition in aftertimes, and he found himself contracting sentiments, manners, and opinions of European growth, which he knew could not suit the regions where he expected to pass his days, and for which he had retained the warmest affection. His father was appointed minister to the court of St. James's; but instead of going with him, J. Q. Adams requested permission to return to his native country, and finish his education among his own people. This inclination exactly concurred with the wishes of Mr. Adams's father.

He returned to America, and after six months of studies with a private instructor, to acquire sufficient knowledge of the Greek language (which, until then, he had neglected) for admission to the university at Cambridge, he entered there in a class advanced almost to the end of the third year of the collegiate course; and finishing with them the usual term of study, took the degree of bachelor of arts, in July, 1787. He then immediately entered as a student at law in the office of Theophilus Parsons, who then resided at Newburyport, and was one of the most eminent lawyers which this country has produced. After three years of attendance there, J. Q. Adams was admitted to the bar in the courts of the state, and fixed his residence in the capital of Massachusetts.

He resided in Boston about four years. His professional practice, during that time, was inconsiderable. His attendance at his office was unremitted; and having little business to occupy his time, he employed much of it in speculations upon political subjects in the newspapers. In the summer of 1791, he published a series of papers in the Boston Centinel, under the signature of *Publicola*, containing remarks upon the First Part of Paine's *Rights of Man*. These papers were for some time attributed to his father, and, for that reason, excited much public notice, both in this country and in Europe. They were at first very unpopular here, as containing political heresy, and questioning the infallibility of the French revolution. But having been republished in England, and received with some public commendation there, they afterwards rose much in the estimation of that class of literary characters among us (and it was once, and still is, too numerous a tribe) who import their opinions, twice a year, from London or Liverpool, with the other articles of British manufacture.

In April, 1793, on the first information that war between Great Britain and France had been declared, Mr. Adams published in the Centinel three papers under the signature of *Marcellus*; the object of which was, to prove that the duty and the interest of the United States required that they should remain *neutral* in that war. These papers were published before president Washington's proclamation of neutrality, and when the writer had no knowledge that such a proclamation was contemplated. There are two political principles which form the basis of the system of policy best suited to the interests and the duties of this country—one in relation to its internal concerns—*union*; the other, in respect to its intercourse with foreign nations—*independence*. These principles appear to be the keys to his political creed. He believed that both the *union* and independence of the nation depended

much upon the establishment of the system of our *neutrality* in the wars of Europe. He thought *that* was the critical moment for the establishment of this system, and there were symptoms of a tendency in the public opinion, which might have involved us immediately in the war, as allies of France. These were the motives which dictated the papers signed *Marcellus*, which were not much noticed at the time, and which have long since been forgotten.

Not discouraged by neglect, our young politician, in the winter of 1793 and 1794, published another series of papers in support of president Washington's administration, in the controversies excited by the French minister, Genet. It was his zeal for the independence of the nation, which again impelled him to write; and on this occasion his sentiments happened to accord so well with the prevailing public opinion, that these papers were received with much favour, and contributed to give reputation to their author.

In May, 1794, he was appointed minister resident to the United Netherlands. The circumstances which led to this appointment were never known to himself. The nomination was, of course, made by president Washington. It was said that his name was mentioned to the president by Mr. Jefferson, before his retirement from the department of state. With Mr. Adams, Mr. Jefferson had some personal acquaintance while he was in France. It has also been said that the papers just mentioned had attracted the president's attention, and led him to make inquiries concerning their author. Mr. Adams's father was then vice-president; but the appointment was as unexpected to him as to his son.

From 1794 to 1801, Mr. Adams was in Europe, successively employed as a public minister in Holland, England, and Prussia. One of the last acts of president Washington's administration was the nomination of him as minister plenipotentiary to the court of Portugal. But while on his way from the Hague to Lisbon, he received a new commission, which changed his destination to Berlin. The nomination of Mr. Adams to this mission was made by his father; and has been represented as an office bestowed by him upon his son. It was even asserted, in the public newspapers, that he had received the separate *outfits* of these different appointments. The truth was, that on his first appointment, in 1794, he received the outfit only of a minister resident, \$4,500; that on his subsequent appointment as minister plenipotentiary to Lisbon, he received, not the full outfit of a minister of that rank, but so much as, with the \$4,500 received in 1794, amounted to that outfit; that is to say, \$4,500 more; making

in the whole, \$9,000, the outfit which has always been allowed to every minister plenipotentiary, from the first appointment of ministers, under our present constitution. In this respect, the case of Mr. Adams, we believe, has been peculiar. There have, at least, been instances of a full outfit allowed, on a new appointment given to a person already abroad—and this circumstance may have given rise to the misrepresentation of the fact, as it respected Mr. Adams. The appointment which he held under the nomination of his father, subjected him to additional expenses, but never gave him the addition of a dollar from the public treasury to that which he should have been entitled to, under the appointment to Lisbon. He resided at Berlin from November, 1797, until April, 1801; and during that time concluded a treaty of commerce with Prussia; which had been the principal object of this mission. He was then recalled, just before the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration. He arrived at Philadelphia, in September, 1801.

In 1802, he was elected a member of the Senate of Massachusetts, and served in that capacity one year. He was then elected, by the legislature of the same state, a senator of the United States, for six years, from the 4th of March, 1803. In June, 1808, he resigned that office. In March, 1809, he was *nominated* by Mr. Madison for a mission to Russia, but a majority of the senate being of opinion that such a mission was inexpedient and unnecessary, no vote was taken on the nomination.

The part which Mr. Adams has acted, while in public life, has naturally been diversified in the detail, by the different offices in which he has been placed. While abroad, his situation was *ministerial*; his general duty was marked out by his instructions; and they were pursued to the satisfaction of the executive authority by which he was employed.

As a member of the state legislature, he made himself obnoxious to a great and powerful combination of banking interests, by a strong but ineffectual opposition to a bank making speculation, of which the time is not yet come to tell the whole truth.

In the senate of the United States, he thought it his duty to support the existing administration, in every measure which his impartial judgment could approve. But while he thus discharged what he conceived to be his duty, he committed the unpardonable sin against *party*. The legislature of Massachusetts, by a small majority of federal votes, in May, 1808, elected another person to represent them, from the expiration of Mr. Adams's term of service, and he immediately re-

signed the remainder of that term. They had passed resolutions, in the nature of instructions to their senators, which Mr. Adams disapproved. He chose neither to act in conformity to those resolutions, nor to represent constituents who had no confidence in him.

It has already been remarked, that, from the unsettled and desultory manner in which his years of infancy were employed, Mr. Adams never attained a profound knowledge of any of the sciences. He had always, however, an eager relish for the pursuits of literature, and acquired, at an early period of life, a taste for the fine arts. In the capitals of the great European nations, the monuments of architecture and of sculpture continually meet the eye, and cannot escape the attention even of the most careless observer. Painting—music—the decorations of the drama, and the elegant arts which are combined in its representations—have a charm to the senses and imagination of youth, vivid in proportion to the perfection which they naturally attain in those large cities, where immense multitudes of men are compressed within so small an extent of space. The exhibitions of excellence in all those faculties, which Mr. Adams had frequent opportunities of witnessing, at the time of life when they were calculated to make the strongest impression, gave him a taste for them, which has contributed to much of the enjoyment of his life.

In the year 1806, a professorship of rhetoric and oratory was instituted at Harvard university, founded upwards of thirty years since, by Nicholas Boylston, formerly a merchant of Boston. Mr. Adams was appointed the first professor on this foundation, and has delivered a course of lectures, on the subjects of the institution, which have been published in two volumes, 8vo.

Here it may not be improper to mention, that while Mr. Adams was minister in Prussia, he wrote that *Journal of a Tour through Silesia*, which gave so much interest to the earliest numbers of this miscellany. The *first* letter formed the *first* article of the *first* number which our accomplished predecessor submitted to the public attention; and we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of transcribing the editorial paragraph, because it shows with what elegance and justice one man of genius can praise another: "The subsequent letter is the commencement of a series, which will be regularly published in this paper. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the general excellence of the following tour. It will be obvious to every intelligent reader, that it has been made by no vulgar traveller, but by a man of genius and observation, who, in happy union, combines the power of selecting the most

interesting and picturesque objects, and of describing them gracefully."—*Port Folio*, Jan. 1801.

These letters were afterwards republished in London, in two volumes, 8vo., without permission from the proprietor of the *Port Folio*, and have since been translated into French.

Mr. Dennie found in Mr. Adams, what, among editors, is termed a constant and valuable correspondent, as very numerous articles in the early volumes of this journal would testify, if it were proper to designate them.

In August, 1809, he returned to a political life, having been appointed minister plenipotentiary to the emperor of Russia. His subsequent negotiations at Ghent, and his recent appointment to the office of Secretary of State, must be fresh in the recollection of our readers.

Mr. Adams was married at London, in July, 1797, to Louisa Catherina, the second daughter of Joshua Johnson, then consul of the United States at that place. He was a native of Maryland, and a brother of Thomas Johnson, some time governor of that state, and a distinguished patriot of the revolution.

## PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

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### LETTER I.

*To the Editors of the American.*

GENTLEMEN: Your recent determination to open your columns to the discussion of the important question, "who shall be our next President?" seems to have given very general satisfaction to those who know the value of your paper, and to none more than to the humble individual who now addresses you. The question now certainly possesses incomparably greater interest than has ever been attached to it, at any former Presidential Election. This is the natural result of time and circumstance. Heretofore, the people have been guided, in their selection of a President, by their estimation of his services in the field or cabinet, during the great struggle for independence. So long as they could recur to the little band of worthies, who had borne a part in the revolution, it was an easy task, successively, to single out the most conspicuous object of the nation's gratitude and admiration. No intrigue, no cabal, no discussion, was necessary to point the nation to the individual, upon whom, with one accord, it had already fixed its view. Our Presidents, indeed, hitherto, have been *wooed*, rather than the *woosers* of the people: they have been the general rallying points of a grateful patriotism, or of some equally noble feeling, which raised them, without solicitation, far above all competitors, whose claims were of younger date than the era of '76.

But a generation has now passed away. Our race of revolutionary heroes and statesmen is nearly extinct; or, if a few still linger on the stage of life, we can no longer hope to find among them, that unwasted vigour of constitution and intellect, which the arduous and important duties of Chief Magistrate demand. Fathers have now yielded their places to sons; the circle from which to select has become greatly enlarged; and merit must be tried by other tests, than those established by the revolution. We are now to look at future *promise*, rather than at past *performance*; at the capacity and the will to do, rather than at what *has been done*.

Under such considerations, it becomes the duty of every man, who has at heart the continued prosperity of his country, to engage in the enquiry. The question to be determined, is one of momentous concern; the office to be bestowed is the highest and most honourable, in the gift of an *enlightened and free people*; and the permanence and wel-

re, or the decline and ruin, of the noblest fabric of government which the wisdom of man has ever reared, may depend upon the issue.

The *Candidates*, who have been induced, by vanity, ambition, the solicitation of partial friends, or other motives, to aspire to this exalted station, are as numerous as though the prize were at the disposal of *chance*, rather than in the hands of a discerning people. Each has own friends, and his invincible enemies; and a species of *warfare* has been carried on among them, which certainly has bore no resemblance to that dignified emulation, which alone should actuate honourable rivals for the people's favour. Your own character, sirs, and the high and well merited reputation of your paper, are sufficient pledges to the public, that the champions who enter the arena which you have opened to them, though they may sometimes "tilt with piercing steel," will at least observe towards each other the courtesies and rights of knighthood. In the very nature of the question to be discussed, indeed, it must become occasionally necessary to speak of the opposing pretensions of the several candidates. In doing this, comparisons will be unavoidable; for, though it should be shown, positively or simply, that any one of them is qualified for the presidency, yet it would be necessary further to show not only that he is *better* qualified than another, but that he is the *best* qualified of all. The only fear of unpleasant collision between your correspondents, will lie in the manner, in which they may put their respective favourites through these degrees of comparison. For myself, Messrs. Editors, "I am one of those gentle ones that would use the Devil himself with courtesy;" and provided you will permit-me to appear *whole* and *entire*, and without the ceremony of *cutting* and *docking*, I promise neither to ask for an unreasonable space in your paper, nor to say a word that shall offend the strictest laws of decorous discussion.

Having premised thus much, I shall now, with your leave, gentlemen, enter without further ceremony upon the question.

I have already stated, what will not be denied, that the unanimity of the people, hitherto, in their choice of a President, has been chiefly produced by a feeling of patriotic gratitude, as well as of admiration, for the successful exertion of talents during our struggle to be free. The same veneration for the *principles* of the revolution, will, it is to be hoped, continue to influence their decision; and since they can no longer hope to find, among the few survivors of that memorable period, that physical and mental energy, without which virtue itself would lose its claim to distinction, they have on-

ly to seek among the candidates, for him who has profited most by the opportunities afforded him, of forming his character after the model of our revolutionary fathers. I have no disposition, Messrs. Editors, to waste either your time or my own, with affected circumlocution on this subject; and shall therefore at once state the proposition, to the demonstration of which all my arguments will be directed. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, in every essential attribute of his character, approaches nearest to that combination of excellence, which has hitherto been the ground of our preference, and is therefore the best qualified to be our next President.

It is not my purpose to write a *biography* of Mr. Adams; but as I shall be compelled occasionally to refer to the chronological events of his life, I must entreat the reader's patience, if matters are again brought before him, with which he is already familiar. When the glorious cry of Independence first issued from the halls of Congress, and the sound was echoed back in thunder from every mountain and valley in the confederated states, the impression which it made upon the hearts and minds of all who heard it, must have been deep and indelible. At this period of universal excitement, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS had just reached the age, when impressions are most easily made, and with most difficulty effaced. The conspicuous part which his immediate family and distant relatives acted, in bringing about this important change in all the affairs and relations of the colonies;—the sort of society by which, under such circumstances, he must have been surrounded—the letter to the family, announcing that the awful *Declaration* had been made—the anxious feelings of a mother, on such an occasion, which must have often burst forth, in the presence of her children, in earnest prayer, for the success of a cause which involved the life and safety of a husband, father and friend;—all these circumstances must have combined to produce on the mind of young Adams, an impression, which no subsequent events could have obliterated, or can ever obliterate. *That impression*, it would be madness to doubt, must have been friendly to the principles of the Revolution.

With such feelings, then, long before the close of the War of Independence, he accompanied his father—who was not likely to let them sleep—to France. Here again, he was surrounded by the friends of American liberty and Independence, and the natural enemies of that government, against which his infant country was struggling. From this time, until 1785, with the exception of a few months, he remained abroad,—partly with his father, and partly in the family of a gentleman who stood high in the estimation of our revolution-

ary fathers : but *always* in situations where it was most certain, his *early impressions* in favour of his country's cause, would be *strengthened* and *matured*. At the period above mentioned, young Adams returned home, and continued in the country for about nine years, that is, until he was appointed resident Minister to the Netherlands, in 1794. It was during this period that he completed his collegiate and professional studies ; "and having," as his biographer informs us, but "little *business* to occupy his time," he devoted much of it to political subjects ; and it is a fact worthy of notice, that the view which he then took, young as he was, of the true policy of this country, in relation to the wars of Europe, was precisely that which was *afterwards* adopted by *Washington*, and subsequently recommended and pursued by *Jefferson*, namely, a *system of neutrality*. He maintained with great ingenuity and ability, that the happiness and prosperity of these states, depended upon their *union* and *independence*, both of which would necessarily be endangered by any interference in the quarrels of foreign powers.

"These principles" as has been elegantly said, "appear to be the keys to his political creed." They were certainly the principles of *Washington* and of *Jefferson* ; and without them no system of policy can lead to the permanent felicity of this government or people. It was in support of these principles, and of the neutral policy of *Washington*, that he published another series of papers in the winter of 1793 and 1794, under the signature of *Columbus*. It will be remembered that about this time, the French Minister, Gennet, had set at work every engine, which ingenuity, cunning, or intrigue, could invent, to create among the people a spirit of hostility to the administration of *Washington*. His machinations were ably and successfully combatted by Mr. Adams, whose labours on this occasion attracted the particular notice and *approbation* of *Washington* ; and would, now that the effervescence of feeling excited by the French Revolution has subsided, command the approbation of *every* unprejudiced American.

Thus far we see, that there is nothing in the political sentiments of Mr. Adams, at variance with the purest and soundest principles of Republicanism. In my next, I shall proceed to shew, that however securely the Federalists may have counted upon him hitherto as *one of their partizans*, they ceased so to consider him, on the first occasion which called for the expression of his *party feelings*, after his return from Europe in 1801.

TELL.

## LETTER II.

*To the Editors of the American.*

GENTLEMEN: In my first letter, which you have done me the favour to publish, and for which I owe you my thanks, it was attempted to be shown, and it was, I think, satisfactorily shown, that there was no expression of a single sentiment or opinion in the public writings of Mr. Adams, prior to the year 1794, at variance with the soundest and purest principles, of *republicanism*. That he had, on the contrary, proved himself not only well acquainted with the system of policy best adapted to the internal and foreign relations of this country, but also an able supporter of that system.

I should hardly deem it necessary to add another word, on the subject of Mr. Adams's early political sentiments, but that great stress has been laid, by the friends of *all the other candidates*, upon *consistency of principles*. No one, I believe, doubts that Mr. Adams *now* belongs to the republican party. There is, in fact, at present, *no other* party in the United States. The Executive and Legislative branches of the government of *every* state in the union, are at this moment *republican*; and the attempt to revive the distinctions and animosities of *party*, by insisting on the necessity of choosing a President who has been *uniformly* republican, has been got up only as a counterpoise to the superior qualifications and pretensions of John Quincy Adams. The absurd attempt to fix upon Mr. Crawford the charge of *federalism*, because, in a moment of patriotic enthusiasm, he forgot the difference of *parties*, and felt and acted only as an *American*, whose country was threatened with danger, was intended, not to injure *him*, but to excite anew the long forgotten animosities of republicans against the administration of Mr. Adams's *father*, and thus, if possible, to bring *his political-sins* to bear upon the *son*. This mode of discussing the question is puerile, as well as illiberal. No man ever lived who, uniformly, and under all circumstances, viewed the same subject in the same light. The faculty of reason is given to us, that we may think and act *according to occasion*. Opinion must be the result of circumstance, and, to be correct, must follow the change of circumstance. Is it because the people of the United States have *changed their principles*, that the whole country is now republican? No—but because the circumstance and condition of the country have undergone a change; and *opinions* on questions of policy, have followed the same course. It is with a view of meeting the question upon these grounds, that I shall be compelled to trouble you with a few additional remarks upon the early political career of Mr. Adams, before I enter upon the much

more important subject of his *present fitness* for the station of president. I shall show, that by whatever *name* he may have been, or may now be, called, his *principles* have been uniformly *consistent*; and that those principles have been, throughout the whole of his political life, essentially *republican*.

It has been seen, that John Quincy Adams was appointed *by Washington*, in 1794, resident Minister to the United Netherlands. He left this country in fulfilment of his mission, more than two years before the commencement of his father's administration, and did not return to it, until some time after Mr. Jefferson had been inaugurated as President of the United States. No evidence whatever appears that, while abroad, he took any part in the controversies of the two political parties at home. On the contrary, the early volumes of the *Port Folio* bear ample testimony, in the journal of a tour through Silesia, the translation from the German of Bulow's travels, and numerous other articles known to be from his pen, that most of the time, which could be spared from his diplomatic duties, was devoted to the more agreeable and most useful pursuits of general literature, history, and science. It is as unnecessary, as it would be unjust, to venture upon conjectures, in relation to the party which Mr. Adams would, *probably*, have espoused, had he been within the United States, during the rancorous and bitter contest which ended in the establishment of a republican administration. It is sufficient that he was *not here* to espouse *either* party; and that he had not previously committed himself by the avowal of any sentiment hostile to the spirit of our constitution or government.

In the autumn of 1801, Mr. Adams returned to the United States, and was very soon afterwards elected a member of the Senate of his native state. I do not mean to deny that he was elected by the Federal party, who at that time had the ascendancy in the state, and who no doubt elected him under the expectation that he would prove an able and willing auxiliary. But the following anecdote will show, that they counted too securely upon his aid, and that his principles were too liberal to suit the character of a partizan. If the truth of the anecdote should be doubted, it can be substantiated by the most unquestionable testimony. The senate of Massachusetts consists of *forty* members: from among these, the constitution requires that *nine* shall be chosen, by joint ballot of both houses, to form the *Council* to the Governor. If the senators so chosen shall *accept* their appointments, their seats in the Senate *remain vacant*, and that body then consists but of *thirty-one* members. From this peculiar feature in the constitution of Massachusetts, it will be readily seen, that when *parties*

happen to be nearly of equal strength, the subtraction of nine members from *either*, might give ascendancy to the *other*.—It is an important piece of policy, therefore, on such occasions, to determine, in *caucus*, who shall be nominated, and to take especial care that the nomination shall lead to no loss of numbers. Soon after Mr. Adams had taken his seat in the senate, he was invited to, and attended, such a caucus of the Federal party; and after some little discussion of the subject, he arose, and in a speech, the liberal sentiments of which astounded the *Essex Junta* and *Hartford-Convention* politicians of the day, proposed that the Council should be selected from both parties in proportion to their respective numbers in the Legislature. He contended, that as the Council was a *public* body, provided by the constitution for the benefit of the *whole people*, and not to serve the purposes of *party*, it was their solemn duty to consult the wishes of the whole people in its nomination, and not the wishes of a part only. This truly republican proposition was of course rejected; and its author was stigmatized as a *theorist*, not yet initiated into the mysteries of *party politics*. From that moment, the *leaders* of the Federal party looked upon Mr. Adams with eyes of suspicion and distrust; and five or six years afterward, when all their hopes and efforts to attach him to their cause had failed, this anecdote was related to a most respectable gentleman, now a member of Congress, by one of the *chiefs of the Essex-Junta*, to shew the party had long regarded Mr. Adams as belonging to the *Jeffersonian school of politics*.

One other occasion only occurred, during the year that he was a member of the Senate of Massachusetts, of further evincing his regard for the interests of *the people*, and his determined opposition to all oppressive monopolies, and aristocratic combinations. I allude to the question of chartering a new banking institution; which had been got up by the moneyed capitalists of Boston for purposes of speculation, and to which many members of the Legislature had been induced largely to subscribe, by a promise from its founders that their shares should be taken from them at a considerable advance. The evil tendency of such institutions was not then as well understood as it is now; but the great body of the yeomanry saw and felt, that it was an association in which *they* could take no part—a combination of the rich against the poor, contrary to the spirit of equality in which our government had originated—and they looked at its establishment, therefore, as an attempt to embarrass and oppress them. Mr. Adams did not hesitate an instant to take the *popular* side on this occasion, in opposition to all the wealth of Boston, and would perhaps

have succeeded, had all the *republicans* in the senate been equally incorruptible. It is hardly necessary to add, that this disinterested and noble conduct, on the part of Mr. Adams, excited a powerful clamour against him among the rich speculators, and tended still further to alienate him from the confidence of the Federal party. TELL.

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LETTER III.

*To the Editors of the American :*

GENTLEMEN : The principles which were early instilled into the mind of Mr. Adams, both by the precepts and example of those with whom his youth were passed, in relation to the natural rights of man, and which are all deducible from our glorious *Declaration of Independence*, have never been for a moment abandoned or compromised by him, on any question of general policy. These principles belong essentially to the character of *an American*. They never were, they never can be, the rule of conduct to demagogues, or factious political partizans, of any sect or denomination. And those who will follow closely, and examine impartially, the political course of Mr. Adams, will be able to trace every opinion which he has given, to the constant prevalence of these principles; they will perceive an *invariable consistency* in every public expression of his sentiments, which we look for in vain among the devoted followers or leaders of *party*. Hence it was, that during the five years that he continued a member of the United States' Senate, he was alternatively claimed by *both parties*, and was sometimes found to stand almost alone, in the maintenance of those fundamental truths, which we proudly boast as forming the basis of our government, and the assertion of which, undoubtedly produced our revolution. It was not enough for him, that a proposition, affecting any great national interest, originated with *this or that party*, to secure it to his support : he examined it on the broad ground of *principle*, and opposed or defended it, according to the honest dictates of a judgment unshackled by preconceptions.

In 1803, the seats of both the United States' Senators, from Massachusetts, became vacant—one from the expiration of the constitutional term of service, the other from resignation before the end of the term. Mr. Adams and Mr. Pickering were elected to these vacancies ; the former for the full term, the latter for the unexpired term. Mr. Adams was the candidate of what was called the *liberal party*, and Mr. Pickering, that of the *Essex Junta*. They had scarcely taken their seats in the Senate, before an opportunity occurred to mark the

difference in the political principles of the two men. One of the most important questions that ever divided the parties,—a measure of policy which constitutes the grandest feature in the administration of Jefferson,—I mean that on the ratification of the *Louisiana Treaty*,—had been decided a day or two before Mr. Adams reached the seat of government. But the measures necessary for *carrying it into effect*, were still under discussion; and, on the question of appropriating the necessary sum for that purpose,—after an able and eloquent speech, (for an abstract of which the reader is referred to the National Intelligencer of 25th Nov. 1803,) in which he took occasion to express his entire assent to the Treaty. Mr. Adams recorded his vote with those of the *republican majority*. He had been lately accused, indeed, of voting against the bill enabling the President to *take possession* of the territory thus acquired by purchase. I use the term *accused*, because, though it is true that he did so vote, his *motives* have been falsely and malignantly interpreted, in order to shew the subjection of his judgment, to “*the pernicious passions*,” and the incapability of his mind “to adopt an enlarged and liberal system of policy.”—The resolutions which Mr. Adams offered to the Senate, on that occasion, will shew, that he was as willing and as solicitous, as the administration itself, to *admit* the people of Louisiana to all the rights, privileges, and obligations that belong to citizens of the United States; but that he was unwilling to *force upon them* either prerogatives or duties, against their own consent, and contrary to the principles of the constitution. One of these resolutions contained a *truism*, which one would have thought it impossible for ingenuity or sophistry to evade—namely, that the people of the United States have not conferred upon Congress *the power to tax the people of Louisiana*;—but, nevertheless, the decision of the Senate implied, that such power had been conferred!

It will occur at once, to every mind, capable of calm and dispassionate reasoning on this subject, that if there was any departure from the principles maintained by our revolution—and violation of those rights which have been declared to be *imprescriptable* and *unalienable*—it was in the vote, of the *majority* on this occasion, and not in that of *Mr. Adams*, whose sole object was to provide for the exercise of the same rights by the inhabitants of Louisiana, which we have declared to belong alike to all mankind, and upon the recognition of which our government had been established. But Mr. Adams himself has already ably vindicated his votes on this question, in his reply to the unprovoked and wanton attack of a member of Congress, from Virginia; and has satisfactorily shewn to *the friends of the constitution*, and to all who have the hones-

ty to acknowledge the danger of extending too far the *constructive powers* of that instrument, that his objections were founded upon a conscientious adherence to principle in which neither *passion* nor *party feelings* had any influence.

A little incident, however, which occurred during these discussions in the Senate, will place in a clearer light than a thousand comments could do, the just estimation in which the *motives* of Mr. Adams were held by the republican party. After the vote had been taken upon Mr. A.'s resolutions, a distinguished member of that party, now deceased,—one who was emphatically called the *man of the people*, and who was deservedly considered as a model of pure and incorruptible republicanism,—took occasion to approach Mr. Adams, and in the honest warmth of his feelings to say to him—"Your heart is right before God! your principles, and the application of them are *unquestionable*,—and the wear and tear of conscience I have undergone, first, and last, on these questions of territorial governments, is *inexpressible*!" It must surely be unnecessary to add another word, in vindication of the *integrity* of Mr. A.'s *motives*, or the *consistency* of his *political principles*.

Those who were conversant with the annals of our government, will know, that, from this time, to the year 1807, no question arose in Congress, the decision of which tested the strength of the two parties. General Smyth, it is true, in a minute and laborious research into the journals of the Senate, has discovered a few votes of Mr. Adams in the *minority*;—but they were chiefly on questions, on which the most active friends of the administration were themselves divided; and on some of them, the names of the most distinguished republican members will be found in company with that of Mr. Adams. The letter of this gentleman, however, above alluded to, "in reply to a letter of the Hon. Alexander Smyth to his constituents," has so fully answered the objections to all those votes, that it would have been a work of supererogation to examine the subject anew: I shall therefore merely refer the reader, who has any remaining doubts as to the *consistency* of Mr. Adams's subject of great national concern.

The transactions of the year 1807, soon be forgotten by the people of the United States. It was in that year, that the flag of our nation was wantonly insulted and violated—that our citizens were cruelly wounded and murdered, within our own dominions,—and that *British officers*, fresh from the friendly and hospitable entertainment of our country, committed a barbarous and *unprecedented* outrage, of which no apology, no atonement, no time, can wear out the remembrance, and

which nothing but the divine precepts of the gospel could teach us to forgive. On this occasion, when the measures which our executive thought proper to adopt, required the unanimous and hearty concurrence of all classes of our citizens, let us see whether the conduct of Mr. Adams resembled that of *the party*, to which it is now pretended he belonged. When the first news of this lawless aggression reached *Boston*, where Mr. Adams then was, he waited in person upon the "*Select Men*"—whose province custom had made it, whenever any occasion required the expression of the public sentiment, to call a *town meeting*,—and forcibly represented to them the propriety and necessity of exercising their privilege on this occasion. *They were Federalists*; and his urgent entreaties, his eloquence, his arguments, were addressed to them in vain. They would not consent to call a meeting of the town.—*The Republicans*, in the mean time having also in obedience to the custom, first solicited the same men for the same object, and with the like success, took upon themselves to invite the citizens of Boston and its vicinity to meet together at the State House. They did so on the 10th day of July, and among the first that came was John Quincy Adams. Nor was he an inactive, silent spectator. He was immediately placed on the committee to report resolutions expressive of the sense of the meeting. And his name will be found, among other distinguished republicans on this committee, associated with that of Dr. Charles Jarvis, Benjamin Austin, Dr. Eustis, and others, the well-known fathers of democracy in Massachusetts. The resolutions reported, and unanimously adopted by the meeting, were published, and may be seen in the papers of the day.—They were such as did honour to the intelligence and patriotism of the committee present; and when the *Federal select men* were afterwards *compelled*, by the indignant feelings of the community, loudly and repeatedly expressed, to call a *general town meeting*, the same resolutions, in substance, were reported and adopted. At this last meeting John Quincy Adams acted as the chairman or moderator.

Until the period just mentioned, the Federal party had continued to flatter themselves that Mr. Adams was not wholly lost to them. But to see his name publicly associated with those of the most active, and of course the most obnoxious, *democrats*,—at a time, too, when they were seeking to collect and rally their forces for a last desperate effort to regain their ascendancy in the councils of the nation,—was not only a death-blow to their hopes, but a signal for the commencement of a *bitter persecution* against him, which compelled him soon after to resign the Senatorial seat which he held at their hands.

Of this resignation, it has been lately said, by one of the most uniform and honest democrats in our country, that it "was greeted by the *democrats* as highly *meritorious* and truly *magnanimous*: meritorious, because he gave up all connexion with a party whose principles he disapproved of—and magnanimous, for his resignation on the sublime republican principle, that a representative ought to obey the voice of his constituents, or give them an opportunity of electing another in his place."

TELL.

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LETTER IV.

The first session of the Tenth Congress was opened, by Proclamation, on the 26th of October, 1807. The Message of the President, which was communicated on the succeeding day, was a document of anxious anticipation and high interest. It entered fully into the state of our foreign relations, and seemed to carry with it a conviction that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, much longer to maintain our peaceful attitude. The session was a busy and important one. The defection of one of the most active and eloquent supporters of the administration, had carried with it a large portion of the republican party; and it required the zealous and continued co-operation of all the friends of our *union* and *independence*, to counteract the two-fold opposition thus created against the Executive.

Of the usual committees, appointed to consider the various subjects embraced in the President's communication, the name of Mr. Adams will be found on all the most important. Of that on the subject of the outrage on the frigate *Chesapeake*, as likewise of that appointed to consider the further legislative provisions necessary for the effectual preservation of the peace of the United States, he was the chairman. On every question of importance, indeed, it will be found by a recurrence to the chronicles of the time, that Mr. Adams was a decided, zealous and able defender of the interests and honour of his country.

On the 18th of December, Mr. Jefferson, by message, recommended the adoption of some immediate and effectual measure to secure the safety of our shipping and seamen; and Mr. Adams was one of the committee which soon afterwards reported a bill for *laying an embargo* in all the ports and harbours of the United States. Such a measure as this was loudly called for; it was the only alternative to open war, for which we were wholly unprepared, by which our seamen

and merchant vessels could be protected from impressment and seizure. It was the measure proposed by Jefferson himself; and many a bitter sarcasm—since thrown out against its *terrapin-like* prudence, has marked it emphatically as the *Jeffersonian policy*. Let us see whether *all* who *now* profess to be of the Jeffersonian School, to have been *uniform, consistent* democrats, and more particularly whether that candidate for the Presidency who is called, by way of pre-eminence, “the democratic candidate,” thought or acted with Mr. Jefferson at *that* important crisis.—Mr. Crawford, who had been appointed by the state of Georgia, to supply the place in the Senate of the United States, vacated by the lamented death of Abraham Baldwin, had taken his seat a few days before the bill, just mentioned, was reported to the Senate. On the question of its *final passage*, *his name* will be found in a *minority* of *six*, in company with that of *Timothy Pickering*, and others of the *Essex Junta* school! while that of Mr. Adams stands at the head of the republican majority. On the *final passage* of the bill for *fortifying the ports and harbours of the United States*, on which Mr. Adams, who was one of the committee that reported it, again voted with the republican majority. Mr. Crawford, after a vain attempt to defeat the bill by the introduction of an amendment designating certain limits within which specified sums should be expended, voted in a *minority of eleven*, in the same *good company* as before. If the Latin adage, *noscitur a sociis*, be always true, what shall we say of the *consistency* of this gentleman’s *democracy*? But these facts are not related with a view to take from Mr. Crawford any merit, which may be claimed for him, on the score of his having been *uniformly* republican. I doubt not that he has been so, from the commencement of his political life. But, as an argument to the contrary might be drawn from these facts, at least as strong as any which his advocates have adduced against the integrity of Mr. Adams’s political principles, they are mentioned merely to remind these gentlemen of another trite maxim—that, “those who live in *glass houses*, ought not to *throw stones*.”—There is not a vote of Mr. Adams on record, which manifests such direct and decided hostility to any measure of Mr. Jefferson’s administration, as these two votes of Mr. Crawford: there is not one for which reasons tenfold more republican, might not be assigned. And yet the *motives*, of the one have been arraigned, by the very men who contend for the exclusive *Jeffersonian* principles of the other. The truth is, that in selecting a President of the *United States*, we must look for some less equivocal evidences of capacity

and fitness, than those furnished by the *Journals of Congress*. Were we to judge by them alone, we should be compelled to come to the conclusion, that *consistency of principle*, and uninterrupted *attachment to party*, are utterly incompatible with each other. And surely, he who looks at a question with the expansive and liberal views of a national legislator, is more fit to be entrusted with the management of a *nation's* concerns, than he who either believes that *his party* can never be wrong, or blindly follows it whether right or wrong. What human wisdom is there that never erred? What system of policy was ever adopted or invented, that would suit all occasions? And is the statesman who adapts his policy to the occasion, to be accused of *apostacy*, or abandonment of principle, because the view which he may happen to take of a measure, at one time, differs from that of *the party* with which he may happen to act, at another? It seems to me, it would be extremely difficult, upon such grounds, to establish the *consistency* of any one of the candidates, or of any other honest and enlightened politician. The same majority that refused to re-charter the old Bank of the United States, on the ground of the anti-republican and pernicious influence of such institutions, gave creation to a new one of thrice more gigantic form and power; and one of the most strenuous advocates of this tremendous machine, was *Mr. Calhoun*, another *uniform* and *consistent* republican. The most intelligent portion of the community, of all parties, would probably have no scruples *now* to acknowledge, that the majority were wrong in *both* these measures. Had the *old* bank been re-chartered, many years of pecuniary distress would have been avoided; and had the new one never been instituted, our country, perhaps, would have suffered less from the disgrace of corrupt and fraudulent speculation.

Having thus followed Mr. Adams nearly to the close of his service in the Senate of the United States, I shall conclude this letter, and this part of my subject, with a few brief extracts from his "Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis," of the 31st March, 1808, written with a view to vindicate to his constituents, the course he had pursued on the subjects of the Embargo, and the differences in controversy between our country and Great Britain. It was in reply to a letter from Timothy Pickering to the Governor of Massachusetts, intended, as Mr. Adams says, for communication to the Legislature, and, therefore to be regarded in the nature of an appeal to their constituents; and to the people at large. "To both these tribunals (*says Mr. A.*) I shall always hold myself accountable

for every act of my public life." After urging some objections to the sort of appeal made by Mr. Pickering, Mr. A. remarks: "It is not through the medium of personal sensibility, nor of party bias, nor of professional occupation, nor of geographical position that *the whole truth* can be discerned, of questions involving the rights and interests of this extensive Union. When their discussion is urged upon a state legislature, the first call upon its members should be to *cast all their feelings and interests as citizens of a single state*, into the common stock of the national concern."

In reply to the *federal slander*, that the embargo owed its origin to *secret corruption*, and terror of Napoleon, Mr. Adams says: "These are fictions of *foreign invention*. The French Emperor had *not* declared that he would have no neutrals. He had *not* required that our ports should be shut against British commerce: But the orders of Council, if submitted to, would have degraded us to the condition of colonies: if resisted, would have fattened the wolves of plunder with our spoils. The embargo was the only shelter from the tempest—the last refuge of our violated peace."—After some unanswerable arguments against the rule of war adopted by Great Britain, he goes on to say: "I am not the apologist of France and Spain; I have no national partialities; no national attachments but to my own country. I shall never undertake to justify or to palliate the insults or injuries of any foreign power to that country which is dearer to me than life. If the voice of reason and of justice could be heard by France and Spain, they would say—you have done wrong to make the injustice of your enemy towards neutrals the measure of your own. If she chastises with whips, do not you chastise with scorpions. Whether France would listen to this language, I know not. The most enormous infractions of our rights hitherto committed by her, have been more in menace than in accomplishment. The alarm has been justly great; the anticipation threatening; but the amount of actual injury small.—But to Britain, what can we say? If we attempt to raise our voices, her minister has declared to Mr. Pinckney that she will not hear. The only reason she assigns for her recent orders of Council is, that France proceeds on the same principle. It is not by the light of blazing temples, and amid the groans of women and children perishing in the ruins of the sanctuaries of domestic habitation at Copenhagen, that we can expect our remonstrances against this course of proceeding will be heard."

My limits will not allow me to make further extracts. But I wish the whole letter could be published, and republished, in every paper in the Union. It would convince the people of the United States, that he who could utter such sentiments could never have been a *demagogue*;—could never have belonged to *party*; and that what Mr. Adams now professes to be, he has been at all times of his political life—a real *American*, a true *republican* in heart and principle, in practice as well as in theory.

TELL.

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LETTER V.

*To the Editors of the American.*

Mr. Adams resigned his seat in the Senate of the United States, nearly a year before the end of his constitutional term of service. The course which he had pursued while in that body, it has been seen was too republican, to give satisfaction to his federal constituents; and they had passed certain resolutions, designed to operate as *instructions* to their Senators, the tenour of which Mr. Adams thought irreconcilable with the existing state of affairs. The same principles, however, which had governed every political act of his life, are manifested in his resignation. For, while he proved his determination to maintain his own independence, by refusing to act in conformity with such instructions, he at the same time gave evidence of his recognition of their right to instruct their representatives, by affording them an immediate opportunity of electing a more congenial one in his place.

His resignation may be regarded, as one of the most complete and perfect illustrations of *political consistency* that ever was exhibited. There is, indeed, scarcely another example of the kind on record. Other representatives, it is true, have acknowledged the right of their constituents to control their votes—have bowed to the will of the majority; but in doing so, they have shown either that they had no fixed principles of their own, or that they were ready to sacrifice both them and their consciences at the shrine of popularity. Politicians, in general, are too apt to regard the obligations of *morality* as subservient to the temporary policy of party. A distinguishing trait in the character of Mr. Adams, on the contrary, is that he acts always upon the principle, that *moral* and *political* integrity is one indivisible virtue, the obligations of which are paramount under every circumstance of application. No devotion to party, no hope of political advancement, could ever induce him to violate his sense of moral rectitude. We

have seen him, therefore, while in the Senate of the United States, pursuing the straight path of duty—turning neither to the right hand nor to the left—flattering no party by a blind and indiscriminate adoption of all its measures—and becoming the able advocate, or the dauntless antagonist, of every proposition according as it tended, in his unbiassed judgment, to promote or to injure, the honour or interest of *the nation*. Can it be doubted, that the concerns of a nation would be safer under the guardianship of such a man, than under that of a secretary in politics, a devotee of party?

But, “political consistency” is every thing, cry the advocates of *all the other* candidates—“We must have a President who has been *uniformly republican*—who voted for the election of Jefferson—who supported *his* administration, and who has been the constant friend of Madison and Monroe.” Be it so; I am willing to agree that we ought to have a President “who has been *uniformly republican*,” and who supported the administration of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe.—But let us compare the pretensions of the several candidates upon these grounds. We have seen that Mr. Adams has been “*uniformly republican*.” We have seen that he was *abroad* in a ministerial capacity, at the period of Mr. Jefferson’s election, but that he did support “his administration” in all its most important measures; and that he opposed it only on points of *constitutional construction*, where its warmest friends might honestly differ in opinion. That he was an advocate of the war, and that he was the friend and supporter of Mr. Madison, throughout the whole of *his* administration, is abundantly proved, by his votes and speeches in the Senate, by his letter to Mr. Otis, and by his having been appointed to, and continued in, by Mr. Madison, some of the most important negotiations in which this country was ever engaged. That he has been the constant, firm, and efficient supporter of the *present* administration, I shall take occasion hereafter to show.

Mr. Crawford, there is no reason to doubt, voted for the election of Mr. Jefferson. But it has been seen, that, during the short period of his Senatorial service under that administration, on two occasions, he *united with its bitterest enemies* in opposing measures, which were regarded as of vital importance to the safety and interests of the country—I mean the *embargo*, and the *fortifying our ports and harbours*. “Call you that backing your friends? A plague upon such backing.” Under Mr. Madison’s administration, Mr. Crawford not only gave his *vote* to recharter the old *Bank of the United States*—a measure in direct opposition to the republican policy, but took an active and virulent part in the discussion of

the question, indirectly denying to the people the right of instructing their representatives, and denouncing those States, which had expressed an opinion, as actuated by *avarice* and the *love of domination*. In the debates on the question of war, on the contrary, Mr. Crawford took *no part*, but sat a *silent* listener, not once opening his lips to utter a single argument in support of the Declaration. Is this *republicanism*? Is this *political consistency*? With regard to the *present* administration, Mr. Crawford's *opposition* commenced even *before* the election of Mr. Monroe. He was a *rival candidate*; and it would be sinning against all experience of human nature to believe, that *defeat* could change his hostility into sincerity of friendship. Until lately, indeed, his opposition has been open and avowed; but it has been found that Mr. Monroe dwells so securely in the people's love and veneration, that *their favour* is not to be purchased by oppugnation to him—and the feelings that were before avowed, are now *disguised*. If this is doubted, let the public papers, and the public men, who have been *constant* in their support of Mr. Crawford for the *last six years*, be consulted.

Let us now apply the same tests to Mr. Calhoun. At the time of Mr. Jefferson's election, he was *not of legal age* to vote. Upon this point, then, he stands on no better ground than Mr. Adams, who was *not in the country*. He did not enter into public life until after Mr. Jefferson had retired. Whatever might have been his feelings or sentiments, therefore, it is certain he could have given no *efficient* support to the administration of Mr. Jefferson. In this, then, though he stands on better ground than Mr. Crawford, he must lose in the comparison with Mr. Adams. He was elected to Congress during the administration of Mr. Madison; and it affords me pleasure to acknowledge, that he was for the most part a zealous and able champion of that administration. On *one* occasion, however, if on no more, it has been seen that he forgot the policy of Jefferson and of Madison, abandoned the great republican interests, and stood forth the active partisan of stock-jobbers and money-lenders. His interest, his eloquence, and his influence, were all exerted to give existence to the new *Bank of the United States*—an institution which every plain and considerate republican, regards as a fearful engine of aristocracy, and as tending directly to the subversion of that purity and simplicity, which form the leading features of our constitution and government. That Mr. Calhoun has been the steady friend of the *present* administration, I admit with pleasure. But so also has Mr. Adams been; and it remains to be shewn

whether, upon this ground, his claims to the support of the people, are *stronger* than those of the latter gentleman. This comparison will be further extended in due time.

With respect to Mr. Clay: it may be said, that like Mr. Calhoun, he did not come into public life, until after Mr. Jefferson had retired from the helm of affairs: for, though he was in the Senate for one Session, namely, 1806-7, the subject on which he was engaged were, for the most part, of a local and domestic nature, involving no party question, and requiring no expression of feeling towards the administration. The claims of these two gentlemen, therefore, are in this respect, equal; and both are of younger date than those of either Mr. Crawford or Mr. Adams. It is evident, that *neither* can make pretensions to the support of the people, on the favourite ground of adherence to the maxims and policy of Jefferson's administration. Under the succeeding administration, Mr. Clay came again into Congress; and proved himself not only one of its most active, but one of its most constant supporters. It is far from my purpose to question his republican principles. His talents are brilliant; his attainments rich and varied; the character of his mind is great and lofty; and his eloquence is luminous, fascinating, and powerful. To whatever party such a man attached himself, he could not fail to be useful. But will it be said, that this splendid Orator has been the constant friend, the uniform supporter, of the *present* administration? Has he not, on occasions deeply involving the interests of the nation, evinced the most decided hostility to the wise and prudent policy of Mr. Monroe? Has he not sometimes used the high power and influence of his station, to the great embarrassment of the operations of government? We shall find answers to these questions in the various reports of *Committees*, selected by him. In some of these, we shall not only discover strong expressions of opposition to the Executive, but find also many sarcastic sneers against a policy, which every consideration of prudence recommended, and which subsequent events have shewn to have been well devised. I would not argue from this, that Mr. Clay has ever deserted his party, or abandoned his principles; or that he has ever been other than a pure, disinterested, and zealous *republican*. But surely the friends of this gentleman, as well as those of Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Crawford, who build their hopes of the people's favour, upon the ground of unshaken devotion to the three republican administrations, will be compelled to acknowledge, that the claims of Mr. Adams are, in this regard, at least of equal validity.

Those who are yet unprejudiced, who examine and compare only for the sake of *truth*, will perhaps discover, that even on this *chosen ground*, he occupies the most commanding height.  
TELL.

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LETTER VI.

In the brief examination of the comparative pretensions of the several candidates, on the grounds quoted in my former letter, I purposely omitted the name of *General Jackson*, for several reasons. 'In the first place, I do not believe that he seriously entertains a wish to be President of the United States, or that his friends have any hope of advancing him to that high dignity. In the second place, I feel so enthusiastic a veneration for his *military character*, that I am unwilling to run the hazard, by too close an investigation of his *other qualities*, of losing any portion of my own respect for him, or of weakening the hold which he now most deservedly has on the love and gratitude of the people. We owe to General Jackson all that can be due to the *soldier*. It was his heroism, during the late war, that turned the current of disaster which had nearly overwhelmed us. He it was, who raised our fallen glory from the dust, and gave new life and hope to his desponding country. But, *non omnia possumus omnes*: the hero in war, does not always prove to be the best leader in peace. The daring intrepidity which constitutes the brightest trait in the character of a soldier, might lead to ruinous consequences if displayed in the conduct of a statesman. The two characters are essentially distinct; and the qualities that might exalt the one to fame and honour, might plunge the other into contempt and disgrace. The true policy of our government is peace: and this perhaps would be always more surely maintained, by having a Chief Magistrate whose title to that high distinction rests upon other ground than military pre-eminence.

Leaving out of the comparison, then, the *victor of Wellington's invincibles*, I think it must be acknowledged, upon a careful and candid review of the public lives of the other candidates mentioned—so far as *consistency of principle*, and *uniform republicanism*, are concerned—that the pretensions of John Quincy Adams, are more substantial than those of any of his competitors. His *enemies*, indeed—the enemies alike of all liberal and expanded sentiment—have made a gross attempt to be *witty* at the idea of his "*republican education and nurture*:"—they have sneered at the *principles of his father*! and have laboured, with the unhallowed zeal of faction, to

cover with odium the declining days of a patriot, whose vigour of life was spent in contriving and securing the independence we now enjoy. To no single individual who bore a part in the revolution, do the people of the United States owe more for the blessing of free government, than to the venerable father of John Quincy Adams. The truth of this is to be found in every history of the time ; it will be acknowledged by every contemporary patriot which still survives. He was among the first of his countrymen to proclaim *resistance* to the oppressive demands of the British ministry ; and his talents, zeal, and influence, were *uninterruptedly exerted* to rouse the spirit of independence throughout the colonies. Could the "education and nurture" of the *son* of such a man, be *other* than "republican?" Could such a *father*, while he was hazarding fortune, fame, and life itself, in support of liberty and independence, instil into the mind of his son, principles adverse to the natural rights of man? Could *any youth*, brought up within the domestic circle of such men as *Samuel Adams, Josiah Quincy, and John Hancock*, fail to imbibe a portion of that manly spirit of freedom which moved, animated, and prompted their every thought and action? Who will dare to claim the merit of "republican education and nurture," if it be denied to John Quincy Adams? But I beg pardon of my countrymen for descending to notice a sneer so vile and malicious. No American could have uttered it, and none, I trust, will be found to give it countenance. Who would have believed, that those who make so much clamour about "political consistency," should be the very men to recur, on all occasions, to the principles of the *father*, in estimating the merits of the *son*? I had thought that it was the boast of this happy country, that every man in it was the artificer of his own honour or shame ; that neither dignities nor qualities, vices nor virtues, were *hereditary*. But these self styled republicans, the pseudo friends of our revolutionary maxim, that "all men are created equal," with an incongruity which nothing can reconcile, while they deny to Mr. Adams the inheritance of his father's *virtues*, which *all* acknowledge, would make him the heir of his political *sins*, which are such only in the eyes of *party*. If he is to be punished for the one, by what rule of justice is it, that he should not be rewarded for the other?

Besides "that he was educated a federalist," it is alleged against Mr. Adams, that he "*is still* a federalist in principle." If this term be here used in its *true* and original sense, I answer, that if he were *not* "*a federalist in principle*," he would be *unfit to administer* the concerns of a *federal government*.—

In the same sense are *Jefferson* and *Madison* federalists; and some of the ablest political papers that ever were written, are from the pen of the latter, under the openly and proudly avowed name of "federalist." Is there *any* American who reveres the constitution of his country, who comprehends the principle of our union, who is *not* a "federalist?" The worshipper of *Mahomet*, might with less absurdity of paradox, call himself a *christian*. But if the term be used in its contracted party acceptation, and meant to signify exactly the reverse of what it literally imports, I have already answered the objection by showing that Mr. Adams has *never* been a *party politician*—and what he *never has been*, it is worse than absurd to say that he *is still*.

It is urged further against Mr. Adams, "that he is *irritable*, and by no means *courteous* in his manner and address." The ground of the first part of this charge is, that he does not silently submit to be abused; that he condescends, on occasion, to repel the unprovoked attack of his enemies, and stands forth, in his own name, to defend that name, from vile, unfounded and malignant slanders. If, to show an indignant sense of injury or insult—to be prompt to defend himself from rude assault—be evidence of irritability, it will not be denied, "that he is irritable." But such is the irritability of every honest man: it is the universal concomitant of conscious probity and virtue; and not to show it, on all proper occasions, would argue either the most consummate *vanity*, or the most despicable *meanness*.—Mr. Adams is equally far from both. The second part of the objection, that he is "by no means courteous in his manners and address," is almost too puerile and ridiculous to be noticed; but, nevertheless, it may be well to undeceive those who, knowing Mr. Adams only by report, have been taught to believe him an unpolished savage, I shall certainly not contend that he is either a *Petit maitre* or a *Dandy*; or that he belongs to the still more modern race of the *Corinthian* or the *Exquisite*. He does not trim his mouth to the perpetual smile, nor discipline his head to the ready bow of the sycophant. He does not bely his candour, by expressing an unselt delight at the intrusion of every impertinent or curious visiter; but still less does he assume the haughty, supercilious, condescending air of vain superiority. His "manners" are formal indeed, but neither awkward nor uncivil; and though his "address" may strike the casual observer as cold and repulsive, those who seek him further, will discover an animation in his eye, a warmth of feeling in his countenance and language, that prove his heart to be "courteous," whatever

may be the external indications. *Sincerity* speaks in every action, too plainly to be misinterpreted; and that should be regarded, among *plain republicans* at least, as a virtue of more worth, than the *courtesy* which teaches the tongue to utter what the heart denies.

It is said, in addition, "that his coldness of disposition will prevent him from attaching to himself any friends. The fact, that he has attached to himself *many* friends, is sufficient answer to this objection. But there is, in truth, *no coldness* in his *disposition*; and those who accuse him of it, forget that, they charge him at the same time with *irritability of temper*: for these are two incongruous qualities, which were never found united in the same mental organization. The *coldness* complained of is altogether in *exterior*; and the friends who are attached by *that*, are seldom worth retaining. The *inner man* is composed of all the kindlier feelings that ennobles human nature—a warm and active benevolence, *expansive* charity, and an honest ingenuousness that knows no deception, that admits no suspicion. The friends of integrity and truth, will always be the friend of such a man.

The last objection brought against Mr. Adams is "that he is not fitted for a practical politician." This, *if well founded*, would of itself have sufficed to exclude Mr. Adams from all consideration, as a candidate for the Presidency. It has been so much the *fashion*, however, for those who know not how to deny the profound wisdom and sagacity of the Secretary of State, to aim at destroying the effect of their unwilling acknowledgement, by representing him as a *theorist*, that I doubt not, upon examination, this objection will be found, like all the rest, invidious and unsubstantial. So far as we have already had occasion to look into the political acts of Mr. Adams, they seem to have been founded upon a sound *practical* knowledge. Let us now see what has been his conduct in the wider field of diplomacy. For this purpose it will be necessary to take a brief review of the state of public affairs in Europe, at the period of Mr. Adams's mission to Russia.

TELL.

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#### LETTER VII.

*To the Editors of the Baltimore American.*

GENTLEMEN: One of your correspondents, who calls himself "A Friend to Truth," in your paper of the 28th June, has accused me of making an unwarrantable assertion, in relation to the vote of Mr. Crawford, on the bill for fortifying the ports and harbours of the United States.

The urbanity of manner and courtesy of style, used by this writer, entitle him to respectful notice; and I must ask your permission to interrupt, for a little, the regular course of my subject, in order to reply to his accusation. I profess to be as much a *friend to truth*, as your correspondent who so styles himself; and should regard my letters as much more worthy to be cast into the flames than offered to your columns, if I thought they contained a single assertion not founded in fact, or a single reflection that could lead to false or unjust conclusions with regard to the character of any one of the candidates. *Truth* alone has been the end and object of my investigations: it is the cynosure by which my whole course has been directed; and when its radiance shall cease to illumine my path, I shall be the first to warn my fellow citizens against the danger of further pursuing my guidance.

Speaking of the bill above alluded to, your correspondent has said, that it "was a *preparation* for an expected war, and ought not to have been opposed by any man who was a friend to his country." This is a much bolder assertion than I should have felt myself justified in making; particularly as it leads to the inference, that no man who voted against *any preparation for the war*, could have been a friend to his country. Now, the *Embargo* was a preparatory measure, a most essential preliminary, growing out of the same expectation of war, and produced by the same train of aggressions; and yet it has not been denied—indeed it cannot be denied—that Mr. Crawford voted against *that*, in every stage of its progress through the Senate. Why should it excite surprise, that he who voted against the first measure of preparation, should vote also against the second? His motives, for either vote, have not been arraigned by me. They may have been pure and patriotic. But it is very certain, these votes did *not* correspond with the views of Mr. Jefferson on those subjects, and that they *were* in exact accordance with those of the *opposition*, in both Houses of Congress, which had just then been organized against the administration, and which owned for its leader a very distinguished member from Virginia, who to this day maintains the ground which he then assumed.

But your correspondent goes on to say, in contradiction of my statement, that the bill for fortifying the ports and harbours of the United States, "*met with no opposition whatever as to its principle.*" There may, perhaps, be some hidden meaning attached to this word "*principle*," which I am unable to penetrate, and which may bear out your correspondent in his bold assertion; but to common understandings, it is ex-

sily made evident," that the bill was opposed even "as to its principle." By recurring to the act as it finally passed, (vol. 3, p. 131, chap. 111, of the Laws of the United States,) it will be found that its objects and purposes were, to *authorize the President* "to cause such of the *fortifications heretofore built or commenced*, as he may deem necessary, *to be repaired or completed*, and such other fortifications and works to be erected as will afford more effectual protection to our forts and harbours," &c. for the accomplishment of which objects and purposes, the sum of one million of dollars was appropriated. Was it "no opposition" to the *principle* of this act, in the first place, to propose to strip the President of the discretionary authority which it gave him, and in the second place, to render the complete execution of it impracticable by apportioning the sum to limits within which it could not be expended for the purposes intended? How, for example, could the President cause *the fortifications heretofore built or commenced* "within the Delaware Bay and river, Jersey and New York" to be *repaired or completed*, if half the sum required for that object, were ordered to be "laid out and expended" "within the states of Georgia, North and South Carolina?" The very excuse offered by "a Friend to Truth" for the amendment proposed by Mr. Crawford, is an evidence of his opposition to the *principle* of the bill. He tells us it was bottomed on the principle recommended by Mr. Jefferson, viz—"To make your appropriations specific wherever the objects can be specified." The objects of the appropriation in this case, we have seen, were to repair or complete fortifications already built or commenced, and to erect such other fortifications and works as should afford more effectual protection to our ports and harbours. Was ever appropriation more *specific*? Or could the objects be more clearly *specified*? But, nevertheless, says your correspondent, "Mr. Crawford, by this amendment, showed his good sense and friendship to the principles of the bill." Was it by refusing to trust the expenditure of this million, to the discretion and patriotism of Mr. Jefferson—the man for whom he professed to feel so great a veneration as to make it a matter of conscience to obey even his recommendation—that he "showed his good sense?" Was it by seeking to load it with unnecessary restrictions and geographical limitations that he displayed his "*friendship to the principles of the bill*?" No, no, I repeat it, Mr. Crawford was opposed to the bill; the design of his amendment was obviously to prevent its passage; and this was well understood at the time by the friends of the administration. Indeed it is not possible to look at the Law, and the amendment or provisio

offered by Mr. Crawford, without perceiving, that if the latter had prevailed, the purposes of the former must have been defeated.

But it is said, that I ought not to have "made the broad assertion that Mr. Crawford did vote against the bill" (meaning on its final passage) without being "able to show the fact from the yeas and nays." Your correspondent had no doubt "examined the journals of the Senate," and convinced himself that the yeas and nays had not been recorded, when he so peremptorily adds, that "*no other testimony*, could have justified" me "in making such a charge"—for, says he, in the same authoritative tone, "had there been *any effort* against the bill, the yeas and nays would *certainly* have been taken."—There never was a clearer *non sequitur*, as the history of legislative proceedings will abundantly show. Nothing is more common than for a bill to pass after its third reading without a call for the yeas and nays, even though it may have been most vigorously opposed during its earlier progress; and it seldom happens, that the opinions of the members are changed in the passage from one reading to another. This would be to suppose an effect from the *speeches* of members, very different from that which they generally produce, and a fickleness of judgment not very honourable to their sagacity. It is enough that the yeas and nays are taken in any stage of a bill, so definite in its objects as the one under consideration, to show who are its opposers. Now, that Mr. Crawford's name appears in a minority of 11 on the question of his amendment, "the journals of the Senate" will show; and, that this amendment was an "*effort against the bill*,"—was substantially an *opposition* "*to the principles of the bill*,"—must, I think, be acknowledged by all who examine the subject with the single view of arriving at the *truth*. Moreover, if "Mr. Crawford's amendment was bottomed," as it is alleged in his excuse it was, on *principle*, if he did not continue firm to the last—if he did not persist in opposing the *unamended* bill—then was he not only inconsistent with himself, but unjust to his constituents and country. If he did not vote against the final passage of the bill, then must he have abandoned his principles, and voted against his own judgment and consciousness of right; and I care not upon which horn of the dilemma, his friends may choose to impale him.

But these two questions of the *embargo* and *fortifications*, were not the only occasions, that occurred during the same session, on which Mr. Crawford differed in opinion with Mr. Jefferson, and the republican majority. If I had been disposed to pursue the subject of his "*uniform republicanism*," or had sought to give currency and support to the charge of former *federalism*, which some of his opponents have brought against him, I might have turned to his vote on the bill for *extending the rights of the suffrage* in the Mississippi territory. Here the yeas and nays were taken; and "the journals of the Senate" show us Mr. Crawford's name in a minority of eight, against the passage of this republican measure. A "*democratic republican*," refuse to give extension to the right of *suffrage*! What will the great mass of people, who own no foot of

land, say to this? But I forbear to enlarge upon the inference fairly deducible from these votes. My only purpose in having mentioned his name at all, was to show, that he had *no better pretensions* to the character of *political consistency*, than Mr. Adams; and this has been abundantly accomplished. The whole public career of the latter gentleman, from the year 1794 to the present period, does not furnish as many instances of inconsistency, or as many evidences of anti-republican principles, as the journal of a single session of the Senate will prove in Mr. Crawford. What is it then which entitles him to the exclusive appellation of the *democratic candidate*, the *Jeffersonian politician*? I desire not to build up the pretensions of Mr. Adams, by seeking to pull down those of any other candidate; on the contrary it is by comparison with the highest claims which can be raised *upon a foundation of truth*, that I shall prove his title to the support of the people. TELL.

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#### LETTER VIII.

GENTLEMEN: In the conclusion of my sixth letter, it was remarked that, in order to understand the nature and value of Mr. Adams's diplomatic services, it would be necessary to take a brief review of the political state of Europe, as connected with our own country, at the period of his mission to Russia, in the character of Minister Plenipotentiary. I shall endeavour to be as little tedious as the necessity of recurring to facts which have already become matters of historical record will permit me to be, and shall content myself with touching upon those points only which are deemed essential to the illustration of my subject.

Mr. Madison, in his inaugural address, delivered upon the occasion of his first election to the Presidency, on the 4th of March, 1809, thus strongly marks the character of the time: "The present situation of the world is indeed *without a parallel*; and that of our own country *full of difficulties*." Adverting to the conduct of the belligerent powers of Europe, he goes on to say: "In their rage against each other, or impelled by more direct motives, principles of retaliation have been introduced, equally contrary to universal reason and acknowledged law." The repeated violations, by Great Britain, of all the established principles of national law, during her long and obstinate contest against the revolutionary governments of France, had indeed finally driven the latter to adopt a system of retaliation, the effect of which was to impose so many vexatious restrictions upon neutral commerce, as almost to exclude it from the common high-way of nations. Instead of the usual and only legal definition of *blockade*, namely, that particular ports must be *actually invested*, and *previous warning given* to vessels bound to them not to enter, these two great rival powers seemed to contend with each other who could set most at defiance all rule of *construction*; and effecting to regard actual and competent force as un-

necessary, they had resorted to the more summary and less expensive mode of *orders* and *decrees*. By this simple process, extensive coasts were put under a state of blockade, even from the date of the Order or Decree, and frequently when the application of an adequate force to maintain it would have been wholly impracticable. These *paper blockades*, however, (as they have been called) so far as France was concerned, were not productive of much serious evil to the commerce of the United States, and would, perhaps, from the great inferiority of her naval force, have remained wholly inoperative, but for the introduction of what was denominated "the continental system."

The grand object which the French Emperor sought to accomplish by this sweeping system, was the entire exclusion of British productions and manufactures from all the countries under his influence. He thus hoped to strike a mortal blow at the only vulnerable point of his enemy's prosperity; and the more effectually to secure its full operation, new restrictions were imposed upon neutral commerce, and still narrower limits assigned to the trade of nations at peace. Neutral vessels were declared liable to seizure and condemnation, not only for having on board articles of the growth or manufacture of Great Britain or her colonies, but for having under any circumstances, touched at a British port, or suffered, voluntarily or otherwise, the visit of a British ship of war. Under such various and cunningly devised prohibitions, it was hardly possible for neutral vessels to navigate the ocean, with any hope of safety. All the great powers in alliance or amity with France had already been induced to accede to her views; and the necessary consequence was, that American vessels were every where detained upon the most frivolous pretexts, and the property of our enterprising citizens was seized and confiscated, upon the slightest ground of suspicion.

To render our commerce still more precarious, and the interruptions to a legal authorized, neutral trade still more vexatious, British commercial speculators had resorted to the practice of *personating Americans*; and to this end, a shop was opened in London, of public notoriety, for the fabrication and sale of all the required papers and documents. British property, under the cover of this false documentation, thus found its way into every port with which neutrals were permitted to trade. The detection of the simulated documents in one instance, naturally induced suspicion in every case; and *bona fide* Americans, in the pursuit of a lawful trade, were compelled on this account to incur such enormous expenses, by detention and judicial investigation, as frequently to swallow up all the profits of the voyage, even when the property has been ultimately released, upon proof of its genuine American character.

Our ministers at the courts of Paris and London, had respectively appealed in vain to the justice of the two sovereigns, by whose collision all the obligations of international law had been successfully *broken down*, and the rights of neutral nations trampled upon and

almost annihilated. Every argument which could be drawn from reason, common sense, common honesty, and the custom of centuries, had been urged in vain to induce these belligerents to relinquish their unjust and absurd pretensions. A ridiculous question of etiquette, as to priority of aggression and retaliation, withheld both France and England from making the first step towards an acknowledgement of wrong ; and the wrong itself continued to grow upon our forbearance.

The Emperor of Russia, who had taken all occasions to manifest his friendly disposition towards neutral powers, and who had more than once declared his determination to protect neutral commerce, was at length brought to lend himself to the views of Napoleon.—Being at war with Great Britain, it became his policy to join in the Continental system ; and his ships of war and cruizers received, and acted upon, the same instruction, with regard to neutral vessels, of which they had so much reason to complain as coming from the other belligerents. The Russian trade had been the chief inducement to the illicit practices of the British merchants ; it was principally for this that they had put on the American character ; and as the London forgeries were so well executed as to render it difficult, in many instances, even for our own officers to detect them, it is not wonderful that American vessels were subjected to all the inconveniences of suspicion in the friendly ports of the Russian Autocrat.

The important rank which Russia held among the powers of the Continent, the extensive influence which her position enabled her to exert, and the high character of her sovereign, conspired to render her acquiescence essential to the successful operation of any general system of policy, for the government of the continental powers. So long as Russia could be persuaded to act in subservience to, or in unison with, the views of France, Napoleon could have nothing to fear from the unrelenting hostility of England. It was a matter of importance to him, therefore, to keep at the court of St. Petersburg, a representative in whose diplomatic experience and sagacity he could confide. At the period to which I have referred, his ambassador to Russia was the Duke of Vicenza, Caulincourt, a name too well known in the annals of diplomacy, as well as in the military history of the French empire, to require that any thing should be added.

The petty powers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, were all united in the Continental league ; and there was scarcely a port in the Baltic which did not exhibit evidence of the wide spread devastation committed on American commerce.

Such was the state of our foreign relations, and such the condition of Europe, when it was thought expedient to send a Minister from the United States to the Court of St. Petersburg. In selecting a suitable person for a mission, which was justly regarded at the time as one of the most important ever sent from our government, *it is fair to presume*, that Mr. Madison would be influenced by the *same sacred regard* for the interests of his country, which, it is ac-

knowledge, characterised other acts of his administration, rather than by any private feelings, or selfish considerations of policy ; and that he would seek, in the character of the envoy to be appointed, not only a sedulous advocate of the just pretensions of the government, but a fit representative of the dignity and independence of the Republic. It was necessary to find a man, not only profoundly versed in the law of nations, firm and able in argument, of approved fidelity and undoubted patriotism ; but experienced, also, in the manners of foreign Courts, and one whose talents and whose prudence might qualify him to attain and support an honourable rank among the celebrated diplomatists, who at that time graced the court of Alexander. Such a man Mr. Madison believed he had found in John Q. Adams ; the appointment was accordingly bestowed upon him, in June, 1809, and as soon thereafter as he could receive his instructions and prepare for his departure, he embarked for St. Petersburg.

That the importance of this mission was not overrated, and that the choice of the President could not have fallen upon a more able or more faithful representative, will be shown in the sequel of these letters.

TELL.

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#### LETTER IX.

GENTLEMEN : After a long interval of silence, which has been produced, partly by causes over which I had no control, and partly by my disinclination to withdraw the attention of your readers from the consideration of their more immediate interests in the State elections, recently terminated,—I now resume my pen, for the purpose of bringing once more to your notice the important subject of the *Presidential* election. It will be remembered that, in my last letter, I had just entered upon the examination of Mr. Adams's diplomatic services. I endeavoured to show, by a brief review of the political state of Europe, at the period of his appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia, that the difficulties and embarrassments of the commercial world, were more deeply felt by the people of the United States, than they had ever been at any former period ; that the mission was therefore regarded as one of the highest importance ; and that it was with a full consciousness of its possessing this character, that the able statesman then at the head of our government, selected Mr. Adams to represent and support the rights and interests of the country. It now remains to be shown, that these great duties were performed in a manner to justify the choice of Mr. Madison, and to produce essential and lasting benefits to the people.

In following Mr. Adams through his ministerial career, however, it must not be expected that I shall go into a minute chronological or historical detail of the various discussions in which he took part ; or that I shall, in every instance, enter into any analysis of the course of

argument, by which he sustained the several objects of his negotiation. It will be sufficient to touch upon some of the most important subjects of controversy, and to notice the *results* in the Russian cabinet, so far as they concerned the United States, and were the unquestionable effect of the zeal and ability with which the discussion was managed, on the part of our minister.

From circumstances into which it is not now necessary to enquire, Mr. Adams took his passage to St. Petersburg in a common *merchant vessel*. His arrival was therefore unaccompanied by any of that display of national pride and power, which usually attends a foreign mission, and which, whatever may be said to the contrary, has an absolute influence in conciliating respect and attention—particularly at a court so notoriously addicted to parade and show as that of St. Petersburg. Notwithstanding this plain and simple style of his *début*, however, he had every reason to be satisfied with the reception with which he was greeted by the Emperor Alexander. It was not only in the most flattering degree, frank, cordial, and respectful to himself individually, but indicative of the most friendly disposition towards the country which he came to represent. He was received and treated in the same manner by the whole diplomatic *corps* then at St. Petersburg; and there can be no doubt that he was indebted for it to the dignity of his own character and deportment alone. It would scarcely have been deemed necessary, to mention a fact so little important in itself, but that it serves to refute a malicious slander which has been industriously circulated by the enemies of Mr. Adams, that the utter insignificance of his character rendered him an *object of contempt* at the Russian Court, and that his awkwardness of deportment was a *standing jest* of the Emperor in the splendid circles of the palace!—Nor is this the only calumny, invented by the impudence and impotence, of those, who have searched the records of his public and private life in vain, to find some foundation of truth upon which to raise an objection to Mr. Adams. It has been audaciously asserted, that when the sovereign of Russia proposed to mediate for peace between the United States and Great Britain, he regarded Mr. Adams with so little respect or consideration as not even to apprise him of the fact of his offer to the British Ambassador, or of that to our government, which was made through his own minister here. And the unblushing fabricator of this falsehood has even had the temerity to appeal to the correspondence of Mr. Adams with his own government, in support of his assertion! But we shall take occasion to speak of this again, when we shall have reached the proper epoch in the history of the negotiation; and shall then see how far truth will bear him out in the appeal.

In ordinary times, the relations between the United States and Russia are not of a nature to create many subjects of diplomatic discussion, and but little more is necessary to a friendly intercourse, than the mere ceremony of exchanging ministers. But the case *was* widely different at the period of Mr. Adams's mission to that

country. He had scarcely arrived at St. Petersburg before treaties of peace were concluded, not only between France and Austria, but between Russia and Sweden. Some of the stipulations in these treaties were peculiarly interesting to the United States ; inasmuch as they seemed to secure the ultimate success of the continental system, and of course to place under still greater restrictions the commerce of neutral nations. The ports of Sweden had before been open to British vessels, and to the free admission of British colonial productions. This circumstance, by leaving to the British the means of controlling the commerce of the Baltic, enabled them, under the protection of their immense naval force, to carry on a trade throughout the north of Europe, in spite of the restrictive decrees of the French Emperor, scarcely less extensive than that allowed in times of peace.

The free admission of British vessels and of British merchandize, deprived the courts and cruizers of the northern powers of all plea for the detention and sequestration of *American* property, since it was only upon the suspicion of *British interest* in the latter that the restrictive system had been made to operate. So long therefore as the ports of Sweden remained open, our commerce in the Baltic suffered but little interruption ; but the total exclusion of British vessels and British colonial articles, and the difficulty—which has been explained in a former letter—of distinguishing between the simulated papers of British vessels and the real American documentation, necessarily gave to the treaty between Russia and Sweden, the effect of operating injuriously upon American commerce.

The treaty subsequently concluded between Sweden and Denmark, which contained similar stipulations ; and the order of sequestration soon after issued by the Danish sovereign, completed the embarrassment of our commercial relations, and left us little more than the empty name of neutrals.

Such a state of affairs could not but give a character of peculiar delicacy to the negotiations of our minister at St. Petersburg. It created a perpetual conflict of interests between the United States and nearly all the other powers who were represented at that capital. We had no minister in Holland, Sweden, or Denmark, in the ports of all which countries, numerous Americans were detained, and millions of property held in suspense. If Mr. Adams voluntarily enlarged the sphere of his negotiations, so as to embrace our relations with these countries, he would be thus assuming the heavy responsibility of interfering in matters not directly entrusted to him, the issue of which might not afford him the justification of success. If, on the other hand, he refused to listen to the letters and memorials which crowded upon him from every port in the Baltic, soliciting his interposition, our citizens and their property were left without protection, to the decisions of Courts which were governed by no law but that of arbitrary power. His situation was novel and embarrassing. He might, it is true, have easily avoided the responsibility

and the trouble of interference, by answering his countrymen with a simple statement of the fact, that his instructions confined him to our relations with Russia alone. But, happily, Mr. Adams was not a man to retire from any responsibility, or to shrink from any trouble, which held out a hope of benefit to his country, or of relief to his suffering fellow citizens. Where he could not officially demand attention in the name of his government, he did not hesitate to ask it as a personal favour to himself; and even before he had reached his destination, he had the satisfaction of being eminently useful to a number of captured Americans by an extra-official interposition in their behalf with one of the Northern Courts.

Soon after his arrival at St. Petersburg, a similar opportunity occurred of putting to the proof the sincerity of the Emperor's professions of personal respect and good will, and of evincing the degree of consideration in which he was held in the diplomatic circle. On the first order of sequestration issued by the Danish government, against the American vessels and their cargoes then in the ports of Sleswick and Holstein, a number of those immediately affected by the order, among whom were several merchants of the most respectable character and standing, transmitted to Mr. Adams a statement of the facts, and earnestly solicited him to make such interference for their relief as might be consistent with his official duties. A direct application to the Court of Denmark, as it did not come within the limits of his ministerial authority, would probably have been answered with evasion, if not with a less civil denial of his right to interfere. But the solicitations of his countrymen were too urgent, and their situation in reality too distressing to be wholly disregarded. He determined therefore to ask the interposition of the Russian Emperor; and for this purpose sought an immediate interview with the grand chancellor, Count Romanzoff, to whom he made a full representation of the case, and expressed his wish that the Emperor might be solicited, as a matter of favour to himself, to exert his influence with the Danish government, for the release of the Americans and their property, which has been thus illegally arrested. Nor did his personal efforts stop here; having reason to believe that Denmark had been merely the passive instrument of France in the adoption of this oppressive measure, and that its object was to suppress the commerce which the English were carrying on with the ports of Holstein, he waited upon the Duke of Vicenza, the French Ambassador then at the Court of St. Petersburg. To him he represented, not only the injustice, but the impolicy, of insisting upon measures which tended to break up all distinctions between the English and Americans, or which, still more at war with their professed purposes, under colour of striking at the English, had their effect of rigour only upon the Americans. He hoped, that if France had really no other object than to put a stop to the illicit trade of the English, she would have no hesitation in interposing with Denmark for the release of all *bona fide* American property.

Mr. Adams waited also upon the Danish Ambassador, the Baron de Blome, to whom, after making a frank acknowledgement of the interferences which he had solicited, he used such further arguments as the nature of his application permitted, and as were calculated to show the absurdity as well as inefficacy of measures tending to distress and ruin the Americans, who were the commercial rivals of Great Britain, for the purpose of affecting the trade of the latter.

From all these distinguished ministers, Mr. Adams received the most respectful attention—an attention the more honourable to him as it was a tribute to his private character, rather than to his public station. The Emperor Alexander, upon the first intimation to him of Mr. Adams's request, expressed his gratification at the opportunity it afforded him of manifesting his friendship for the United States, as well as his personal regard for their envoy, and ordered an immediate representation to be made to the Danish government of his wish for the speedy restoration of the American property. The influence of Alexander with the Danish Sovereign may be seen in the result of his interference, which is at the same time the best evidence that can be given, not only of Mr. Adams's devotion to the interests of his country, but of the high estimation in which he was held at the Court of this powerful Sovereign. Upwards of five millions of American property were ultimately restored; every cent of which, it is believed, would have been lost, but for the zealous interference of Mr. Adams. TELL.

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#### LETTER X.

GENTLEMEN—In my last letter, it was observed, that the peculiar state of political affairs in Europe about the period of Mr. Adams's embassy to Russia, produced a perpetual conflict of interests between the United States and the powers which had fully united in the restrictive system of Napoleon. This continued to be the case during the whole of the year 1810 and a great part of the year 1811. Our commerce in the northern seas was made to suffer every hardship and wrong, which the ambition or the rapacity of the belligerents could inflict upon a defenceless neutral. Notwithstanding the good disposition which had been, in several instances, manifested towards us by the Danish government, and the equitable principles by which it constantly professed to be actuated, the conduct which it observed towards us bore every mark of the most inveterate hostility, and evinced a total disregard of every principle of justice.

It was very soon evident, that this strange and unprincipled incongruity of profession and practice on the part of Denmark, was the work of the French Emperor, whose influence was paramount at Copenhagen. He had, it is true, but lately instructed the Duke of Cadore to declare to our minister at Paris, that his mas-

ter loved the Americans, and that their prosperity and their commerce were *within the scope of his policy*—but this amicable declaration had scarcely passed the lips of the noble Duke, when orders were issued by the Sovereigns of Denmark, Mecklenburg, and Prussia, excluding all American vessels from their ports; and their Sovereigns were notoriously the mere puppets of Napoleon, in his grand scheme of cutting off the commerce of England with the Continent.

The same efforts were made at St. Petersburg to obtain from Alexander a similar demonstration of *love* for the Americans.—The Duke of Vicenza, whose rank of ambassador gave him the privilege of frequent personal intercourse with the Russian Sovereign, lost no opportunity of endeavouring to persuade his Imperial Majesty, that his protection of American commerce was not only incompatible with his alliance with France, but was in fact a direct encouragement to the trade of their common enemy, England; and that his own policy therefore required the exclusion of American vessels from the ports of Russia, or at least, a prohibition of *all colonial articles*. It was even reported that the Duke had actually demanded of the Autocrat, in terms of threatening import, the immediate adoption of the latter measure—which would, in its effect, have amounted to an exclusion of our vessels, as our trade with Russia consisted principally of colonial merchandize. The report, derogatory as it was to the independence of their Sovereign, gained credit with some of the principal merchants of St. Petersburg, who in great alarm held a meeting among themselves, for the purpose of devising means to counteract the intrigues and machinations of France. They regarded the propositions as fraught with the most pernicious consequences, not only to their own individual interests, but to those of the empire at large, and they were seriously apprehensive, lest the anxiety which the emperor had constantly manifested to maintain, at all hazards, the friendly footing upon which he stood with Napoleon, might induce him to make the sacrifice. Intelligence of the meeting was communicated to the French ambassador, who, finding that the rumour in circulation was rapidly exciting feelings by no means favorable to the advancement of his project, caused it to be denied that any such demand had been made; but the denial itself was accompanied by so unequivocal an avowal of the *expectations* of France on the subject, that it tended rather to exacerbate than allay the excitement produced by the report.

The conduct which Russia might ultimately adopt, in relation to this leading feature of the continental system, was of momentous concern to the commercial interest of the United States. Our trade with the north of Europe, already reduced to a shadow, would have been wholly annihilated by an exclusion from Russia; and it had hitherto been the first principal of her policy to avoid every cause of disagreement with France. She had already, indeed, assented, evidently in pursuance of this principle, and not

because her own interests required it, to the prohibition of several articles of colonial produce; and there was every reason to fear, that if France persisted in demanding the full sacrifice, Russia would be induced to make it, rather than throw herself upon the alternative of a war, for which she was not prepared.

It must be obvious that, under such circumstances, the American minister had an arduous and difficult task to perform. In advocating the rights and interests of his own country, he had not only to contend against the immense power and influence of France, and the secret intrigues as well as open negotiations of all the foreign ministers at St. Petersburg; but he had also to combat the prejudices and fears of the Russian government itself; to reconcile the policy of protecting neutral commerce with the most perfect good faith to France; and to demonstrate the absolute inefficiency of the whole continental system as a mean of bringing England to peace. It would perhaps be too much to say, that the conviction produced by the reasoning of Mr. Adams, was the sole ground of the Russian decision upon this important question; and yet if we take into consideration the earnest desire of Alexander to preserve peace with France, the strong and anxious voice of all his council to the same effect, and the threatening movements of French troops, which indicated an intention on the part of Napoleon to enforce his demand at the point of the bayonet, it is hardly possible to conceive that any *other* influence could have operated upon the Russian government, to induce it to persist in keeping the ports of the Empire open to American commerce, and to the admission of colonial merchandize. Whatever may have been the causes, it is certain that the triumph of the American minister was complete, in the attainment of the object to which his negotiation was directed; and it is no equivocal evidence of the masterly style of his arguments, that they succeeded against the powerful inducements which opposed a decision so unfavourable to the designs of France.

Another question of intermediate interest to the United States, and in the discussion of which Mr. Adams was again brought into collision with the French Ambassador, related to the admission of a large fleet of American vessels, which had been detained at some of the out ports of Russia, to await the necessary examination by the Commission of neutral navigation. In proportion as this examination promised the favourable decision of the Commission as to the neutral character of the property, the French government became more active in its machinations to counteract such a result. The *Moniteur*, the French official gazette, began by insinuating that though these vessels were under *American* colours, they were employed by *English* merchants; that though they might be provided with all necessary certificates and clearances, yet it was notorious that such papers were fabricated in London, and that the American flag was constantly prostituted to cover the illicit trade of the English. The Duke of Vicenza

next alleged, that they were furnished with *certificates of origin* from the French Consuls in the United States, and argued that *these must be forgeries*, inasmuch as the French Consuls in America had long since been ordered to deliver no more such papers. This was afterwards repeated in an official form by the French Consul at St. Petersburg, who was ordered by his government to make a formal declaration to the Russian minister of State, that the papers produced as certificates of origin were not given by the French Consuls, and must necessarily be forgeries.

The fate of nearly one hundred vessels hung upon the issue of this examination; nor was this all; for, upon the nature of the decisions in these cases, would depend the extent of our future commerce with Russia. It may seem somewhat extraordinary, that, as certificates of origin from French Consuls were not at all requisite to the admission of American vessels into the ports of Russia, their fate should be in any manner connected with the question of the *authenticity* of these papers. But the mystery vanishes, when it is known, that, by the existing laws of Russia, the entire cargo of any vessel bearing a *forged paper*, was made subject to *confiscation*. The French government were well aware of this regulation; and as there was but little hope of establishing the charge of British interest, at least in a majority of the cases, if they could induce credit to be given the declaration which they had caused to be made to the Russian government with regard to the Consular certificates, they knew that sentences of confiscation would follow, and that thus their object would be accomplished against the American vessels, as effectually as by the proof that they were British property.

With regard to the real American character of the vessels and their cargoes, Mr. Adams did not find much difficulty in satisfying the Russian government. By several of the vessels, he had received both public and private letters, the *dates* of which were abundant evidence that they had proceeded directly from the United States, and that they could not have touched at any port in England. But as it respected the authenticity of the Consular Certificates, he had nothing to oppose to the French official declaration that they were false, but the evidence of the papers themselves, and his own confidence in the truth of those who produced them as genuine. He contended, that though it might be true that the French government had given orders to their Consuls in America to issue no more such papers, it did not follow that those orders had been received before the sailing of the vessels; that this untimely and indelicate disavowal of the acts of their own accredited agents, would only tend to destroy all future confidence in them; and that it served to show, that France where she could not *command*, would resort without scruple to falsehood and deception to accomplish the same object—thus falsifying the acts of her own officers, and bringing the charge of forgery against the American vessels, with a view to prevent Russia from enjoy-

the benefits of a commerce, from which she herself was debarred.

The result of this discussion is well known to our merchants. The untiring perseverance, manly spirit, profound wisdom and knowledge of European policy, with which it was carried on under every disadvantage, forced even the French Ambassador to retire from his positions; and the decisions of the Russian government, afforded Mr. A. the satisfaction of congratulating his countrymen, who had been so long held in suspense, upon the successful vindication of their integrity, and their admission to the full enjoyment of the Russian trade and protection. TELL.

#### LETTER XI.

GENTLEMEN :—It is not always in conducting a particular negotiation to the desired issue, that a minister abroad has it most in his power to display his diplomatic fitness and capacity, or to render the most acceptable service to his country. If he be an habitual and sagacious observer of what passes around him; if he be a man of prudence and sound discretion, endowed with the faculty of just discrimination;—if he possess a mind eager to seek, and ready to receive, increase of knowledge from every source which may present itself; a judgment chastened and corrected by extensive observation and experience, and incorruptible moral integrity, dignity, and firmness of deportment and conduct, and above all, a sincere patriotic desire to advance the permanent interests and glory of his country :—if this be the character, temper, and disposition, of the envoy—and unless it be, he would scarcely deserve to be regarded as more than a common messenger—his official situation gives him opportunities of collecting, arranging, and imparting to his government, a mass of information, in relation to the civil and political history of other nations, their principles of government, modes of administration, natural resources and connexions, habits, intercourse and necessities, of infinitely greater and more lasting benefits to his country, than the attainment of any single object of negotiation, whatever may be the extent or importance of its temporary effects. It is in this way only, that a foreign minister can properly be said to fulfil all the duties of his appointment, or to deserve the reputation of a profound and skilful statesman.

Those who are acquainted with the course of education, principles and habits of Mr. Adams, need not be told, that his character combined, in a pre-eminent degree, all these requisite qualifications of an able minister. A long residence abroad, under peculiarly favourable circumstances, both in a private and public capacity, before he was sent to Russia, had enabled him to add to his other advantages, the acquisition of a *practical* and thorough knowledge of most of the *languages* of Europe. This knowledge not only afforded him the means of becoming more intimately ac-

quainted with the temper and disposition of the sovereign at whose court he resided, and of the ministers through whom his negotiations were conducted; but it gave him facilities of intercourse with the contemporary ministers from other countries; it enabled him to reach sources of information, as to the mutual relations of those countries, and the particular policy by which each was influenced, from which others were excluded, or which could come to them only through the corrupt channels of interpreters and translators; and finally—which is not the least of the many advantages derived to a minister from a knowledge of the language of those with whom he corresponds—it enabled him to see and comprehend the nice and delicate shades of distinction, in the diplomatic construction of terms, upon which the whole effect of an important discussion is often made to depend.

The official correspondence of Mr. Adams with his government, during his residence in Russia, will abundantly confirm what is here said of his superior qualifications and acquirements. His letters display a consummate knowledge of mankind, and exhibit an acuteness of remark, a patience of investigation, an extent and variety of information, political, historical, and miscellaneous, which will continue to afford interest and instruction to the statesman, long after the particular objects of the mission shall have been forgotten. At the Russian Court, which was at that time remarkable for the brilliancy of its diplomatic circle, the character of Mr. Adams well understood and properly estimated; and no foreign minister there enjoyed a higher distinction. Nor was the respect which he inspired confined to his ministerial character, as is evinced by the warm interest expressed, even now, in the household of the Emperor, whenever any thing transpires, in which his name is concerned. But let us return to the history of this mission:

It may be readily imagined, that France was not very well satisfied with the determined protection, which Russia seemed inclined to extend to neutral commerce. In the first place, the refusal of the Emperor to unite in the measure adopted by Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, of excluding all American vessels from their ports: his decision in the second place, with regard to the French tariff of prohibitory duties upon all colonial merchandise; and lastly his refusal to confiscate, or even to exclude, the American vessels from Gottenburg, on the pretext set up by France, (as explained in my last letter,) that they were English property in disguise,—which amounted in fact to an expression of distrust in the *veracity* of the French government,—were all disagreeable manifestations of good will towards the United States, and just so many insuperable obstacles to the full success of Napoleon's favourite scheme of policy. While Russia refused to join in the "*auto da fé*" of English merchandise—as the *burning* decree of Napoleon was called—or to shut her ports against the neutral commerce, it was probable that the famous continental system would either re-

main a dead letter, or have the effect of injurious operation upon those powers only who most faithfully adhered to it.

The feelings of the French Emperor on the subject, were soon made evident in the recal of the Duke of Vicenza, from the court of St. Petersburg. This measure, it is true, was ascribed to the *ill health* of the Duke, and the appointment of a successor to him, accompanied professions, on the part of Napoleon, of unaltered friendship for his august ally, seemed to confirm this pretence. But the military movements and warlike preparations, which were unremittingly pursued throughout the French empire, told a different story, and afforded strong grounds of belief that the moment was at hand, when the peaceful relations of the two countries would be broken up.

Alexander was not blind to the preparations of his Imperial friend, nor to their concealed object. He had been even more active, indeed, than Napoleon, in preparing to defend himself; but though he was now completely ready for an appeal to arms, and might have obtained immense advantages, by seizing any one of the many pretexts which Napoleon had given him, to strike the first blow, yet he chose rather to persist in his peaceful policy, and not become the aggressor. In pursuance of this policy, Count Lauriston, the successor of the Duke of Vicenza, was received with every mark of the most distinguished courtesy, while the retiring minister carried with him more signal proof of the Emperor's munificent kindness, than had ever before been bestowed upon a foreign envoy; and, for a time, all rumour of war between the two empires was hushed.

In enumerating the grounds of difference between France and Russia, I have purposely confined myself to those in which the United States were a party concerned. There were others, and probably important, cause of disagreement between them; but they were chiefly of a nature to admit of easy adjustment; or, at least, they were not such as would very speedily have led to an open rupture. Those points, on the contrary, in the discussion of which the interests of the United States required that Mr. Adams should take part, were, as I have shown, so intimately connected with the *Continental System*, upon the full operation of which Napoleon founded all his hopes of bringing England to his feet, that the decisions of Russia, as lately adopted upon them, might be regarded as the triumph of neutral rights, and of course as a death blow to the policy, which France had been so long labouring to establish. This state of affairs, so plainly indicative of the declining influence of the French emperor, so favourable to the commercial interests of the United States—so essential indeed to the very existence of their commerce with the continent of Europe, was, if not wholly produced by the wise and prudent exertions of Mr. Adams, certainly attributable in a great measure, to his unwearied zeal, his luminous discussions, his personal influence, and the high respect entertained by the counsellors of his Russian ma-

gesty, for his deep political foresight, and profound sagacity as a statesman.

These are facts which speak more loudly than a thousand comments, in praise of Mr. Adams. We have no example in our diplomatic history, of a minister so peculiarly and so delicately situated as was Mr. Adams in Russia: this deserves to be constantly held in remembrance, in order to do full justice to his merits.— Other envoys, to other countries, have been, in the very nature of things, circumscribed to narrower limits in their negotiations: they have been for the most part, confined to discussions with a single government, upon the exclusive relations of that government with our own. In Russia, on the contrary, almost every proposition in which the interests of the United States were concerned, was either immediately or remotely connected with some other foreign relation, and met with the uniform resistance, secret or open, of nearly all the powers in amity or alliance with that empire. All the influence and arrogance of a power, unaccustomed to control; all the intrigue, cunning, and finess of numerous subordinate agents, anxious to win the approving smile of the great Master Spirit, were brought into active operation against us.

The courage even to enter the field against such appalling odds, was in itself a wreath of honour to our Minister; but, to be able to maintain his ground, and still more, to atchieve repeated victories over the hosts that opposed him, was a triumph, which raises the diplomatic character of Mr. Adams, to a point of pre-eminence, which posterity will long regard with admiration, and which his country cannot but feel proud to contemplate. We shall have occasion, as we proceed, to observe how nobly he sustained this character, in the further negotiations which circumstances imposed upon him.

TELL.


REFLECTIONS,  
ON THE  
CESSION  
OF  
LOUISIANA  
TO THE  
UNITED STATES.

BY SYLVESTRIS.

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WASHINGTON CITY:  
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## REFLECTIONS

### ON THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO THE UNITED STATES.

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THE cession of Louisiana to the United States is an event, of which the most sanguine speculative politician could scarcely have ventured to indulge a hope: When the treaty of peace in 1763, left the French nation in possession of that part, only, of its former territory in North America, it became an object with the Spanish government to possess it; probably, not from the expectation of any immediate profit to be drawn from it, but rather with a view to retain it as a barrier against the growing power of the British colonies; by interposing between them and her Mexican dominions, either the natural obstacles of a vast uncultivated wilderness, or a line of military posts, whenever the occasion might require it. This we may suppose to be one of the principal inducements to Spain to obtain it; which she did by treaty with France about the time of the conclusion of the peace, or not very long after.

So long as Louisiana appertained to Spain, whose pacific and unenterprising character promised to make her a quiet neighbour; and whose weakness and valuable possessions on the western coast of North America might be considered as a perpetual guarantee of the same line of conduct on her part; the acquisition of that immense country was by no means a desirable object to the United States, who are already possessed of more than ten times as much land as they have hands to cultivate.

cient for me, that the object has been fully obtained.

This cession comprehends "the complete sovereignty of the town and territory of New Orleans, as well as Louisiana, as the same was heretofore possessed by Spain:"\* by which I understand the whole of the Spanish territory lying between lake Pontchartrain, lake Maurepas, and the river Mississippi; and between the Mississippi and the ancient boundaries of Louisiana to the westward, northward and southward; with the precise limits of which I do not pretend to be acquainted†: yet

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\* Letter from Rufus King, Esqr. our ambassador at London, to Lord Hawkesbury.

† Before the war which terminated in the year 1763, France, then in possession of Canada and Louisiana, under the name of Louisiana, laid claim to the whole territory, now constituting a part of the United States, and lying between the Mississippi on the west, the lakes on the north, and the Alleganey, or Apalachian Mountains on the east; as also to the territory west of the Mississippi, from the river of the north, which empties itself into the Gulph of Mexico, in the latitude of 26 : 12, north, to the Canadian boundary on the north; and, as may be presumed, to the line of the Spanish dominions of Mexico, on the west, as far as the head waters of the river of the north, and those of the Missouri, the principal branch of the Mississippi yet known, towards the north west, extend. These limits have never been precisely ascertained, so far as is known to us.

By the treaty of peace in 1763, the entire province of Canada was ceded and guaranteed to the English, with all that part of Louisiana, as theretofore claimed by France, which lies east of the Mississippi, and of the peninsula of New-Orleans, separated from the Floridas by the river, canal, or gut of the Ibberville, lake Maurepas, lake Pontchartrain, and that part of the Mexican Gulph communicating with those lakes. France having ceded to Spain the day before the treaty of peace was signed, in full property, and without any exception, the whole country *known by the name of Louisiana*, the river Mississippi from its source to the canal or river of Ibberville, together with that river, lake Maurepas, and lake Pontchartrain, as above described, was established as the perpetual boundary between England and Spain. The Floridas as then ceded to England having at the peace of 1763, been receded to Spain, the boundary established in 1763, between Louisiana and West Florida was probably continued, and may be regarded as the subsisting boundary at this day, between those countries.

there is reason to believe that it contains an extent of territory little, if at all, inferior to that of the United States. The terms upon which this immense cession has been made are, eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to be paid to France, in six per cent stock, within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, and delivery of possession. Secondly, the United States assume the payment of three millions seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars to our own merchants for debts due to them, and captures provided for under the convention of 1800, between the United States

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When France, a few years past, obtained from Spain the re-cession of Louisiana, it was intimated, and is highly probable, that the cession was made according to her former extensive claims; whether any precise, or general boundary was designated by that treaty, is probably unknown on this side of the Atlantic; but being ceded to the United States as fully and amply as the cession was made to France, whatever her claims were under that treaty, the United States are now entitled to claim.

Louisiana, then, as ceded by Spain to France, and by France to the United States, may be supposed to extend from the river of the north, in the latitude of 26: 12, on the south, to the head branch of the Mississippi, in the latitude of 47: 38, north, and longitude of 95: 6, west, as the same is said to have been ascertained by a Mr. Thompson, astronomer to the north-west company, who, according to the late traveller Mackenzie, was sent expressly for that purpose, in the spring of 1798, comprehending a distance of nearly fourteen hundred miles from south to north. Its western limits are not so easy to be described; but it is probable that a chain of mountains partially laid down by Mackenzie in his map, and running nearly parallel to the Mississippi, about the longitude of 112: 30, west, (in which it seems probable that the heads both of the river of the north, and of the Missouri may be found,) will be considered as the proper and natural boundary between the Spanish dominions in Mexico, and the territory of Louisiana; a distance probably not less than eight hundred miles from east to west. These limits may describe an area of more than a million of square miles; and comprehend a territory more than equal to the whole of the United States, as settled by the peace with Great Britain in 1783.

See the king of Great Britain's proclamation for the settlement of Canada, and the Floridas, October 7, 1763. Bessant's *Memoirs of the House of Hanover*, and of the reign of George the third; and Mackenzie's travels through the continent of north America, and Carver's travels.

and the French Republic, if the same, when liquidated, shall amount to so much; making in the whole fifteen millions of dollars. Thirdly, French and Spanish vessels and merchandizes directly from their own ports, for a period of twelve years, are to pay no higher duties than American citizens, after which they are to be upon the same footing with the most favoured nation. Fourthly, the inhabitants of Louisiana are to be incorporated with the United States, as soon as can, consistently with the constitution of the United States, be effected: and in the mean time are to be secured in their liberties, property, and religion.

Such are the terms upon which this important cession has been made to the United States; upon which I shall make a few remarks, before I proceed to consider what may be regarded as the solid and permanent advantages which the United States may derive from this most fortunate negotiation.

From a statistical table of the United States (for which the public is indebted to the labours of Mr. S. Blodget,) I find the quantity of land therein is estimated at six hundred and forty millions of acres; and, if I have not been misinformed, the territory of Louisiana contains at least an equal quantity of land, and it is by many believed to be of at least equal, or superior, quality. If there be six hundred millions of acres, only, the purchase at fifteen millions of dollars amounts to twenty-five *milles*, (or the fortieth part of a dollar,) only, per acre:—consequently, one dollar purchases forty acres of land. I believe that none of our *balloon-land-mongers* have purchased their lands at *quite* so low a rate. Consequently, regarding the transaction, merely as a speculation with a view to a pecuniary profit, the most experienced financier in the land-jobbing business would be obliged to acknowledge it to have been a *lucky bit*. When a former Secretary of the Treasury *intimated to Congress that twenty cents per acre,*

was as much as could reasonably be expected for our western lands, many who were in the habit of thinking only as he thought, supposed they could not possibly be made to yield any more. Nevertheless, when Congress fixed the lowest price of them at two dollars per acre, it was soon discovered that there would be purchasers at that price, and even *more*. But, without adopting this estimate, let us recur to that of the former Secretary, and we shall find that what we have paid for this territory, is but the *eighth part* of his estimate. Consequently, we may venture to pronounce, that this acquisition regarded as a mere pecuniary transaction, is a *good bargain*.

Little need be said as to the terms of payment; they are as easy as we could possibly have expected. By paying stock, instead of ready money, we are relieved from the payment of the principal at present, and it is probable the purchasers of the stock will not wish to receive it until we force it upon them. This turn of the transaction shews something of more importance, not immediately connected with this business, which I cannot help mentioning, *en passant*; I mean the high state of the public credit of the United States, among foreign nations; for unless that was the case, the court of France would probably have excused itself from the trouble of turning our stock into cash, in order to pay themselves, and insisted that we should have paid down the money.—Another important consideration is, that by the *payment of stock*, instead of assuming the payment of money at a future day, the debt will be transferred from the *French government*, to *individuals*; with whom it may be more easy to treat about the payment of the principal, than with a powerful nation in need of money. The payment of the interest annually will probably be directly or indirectly reimbursed from the consumption of foreign articles in the western states. *If the impost be not collected at New-Orleans, it will*

would never have enjoyed any permanent state of tranquility in that quarter : and hostilities there would have led immediately to a general war with that nation. The issue of such contests I must again decline the attempt to calculate, or to foresee : but we may venture to affirm that in no event whatsoever could we hope for the possession of Louisiana upon such advantageous terms as we have obtained it.

*Thirdly*; we have secured, without the possibility of future annoyance or interruption the free navigation of the river Mississippi; both sides of which we now possess, I presume, from New-Orleans to its mouth ; as also all the advantages of an excellent port, and deposit for the imports and exports of the western states.

When we reflect that the depriving us of a place of deposit for our western commodities was thought by our warm politicians, of itself, a sufficient cause of war; and when that object is acquired, without any expence of blood, at a price less than the probable expenditure of one year during a war; we must be satisfied the acquisition of these advantages alone, without regard to the territory of Louisiana, is of immense value to the United States. The perpetual removal of the means of annoyance to the commerce of the western states, can only be estimated by recurrence to the history of those countries, where those means have either been the successful engines of oppression, or the cause of almost incessant wars, between neighbouring nations, for ages.

*Fourthly*; by this cession we have obtained for the western states and their commerce, a strong and, in effect, an impassable barrier against invasion, or annoyance from the west, or south ; since it will now be impossible for any attack to be made upon them from either of those quarters, without first reducing New-Orleans; which from its situation is capable of affording them powerful protec-

tion against hostilities from the sea, should any attempt from that quarter be meditated, which is now rendered altogether improbable. And in this point of view, as it respects the United States in general, this important acquisition may be regarded as the most momentous object which has been achieved on the part of the United States since the final establishment of their independence by the treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1783, with the single exception of the adoption of the present constitution of the United States. For now the United States are, as it were, insulated from the rest of the world. Divided from Canada by extensive lakes, or a bold and rapid river, which we are precluded by treaty, from navigating, no causes of misunderstanding are likely to arise from that quarter; nor can any danger be apprehended from the weak and barren province of Nova Scotia. Past experience has shewn us the value of our barrier on that side of the United States: The Floridas, whilst they remain in the possession of Spain, will, from their weak, and uncultivated state, always be a barrier to us in the opposite quarter of the Union: Louisiana now affords us a barrier (instead of a frontier,) of one thousand miles on the west, extending completely from Canada to the Floridas.\* Our eastern frontier is the only part of the United States which will now remain exposed to the immediate attacks of foreign nations; and on that side, it is our happiness to be divided from

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\* If Great Britain in the course of the present, or any future war with France, should have obtained the possession of Louisiana, the United States would have been encompassed by that power, entirely, except on the side of Florida, and the Atlantic. Had she been disposed to render the acquisition formidable, to us, it was in her power to have injured us more than France. The similarity of manners, of laws, and of language would have aided all her projects against us, and we never could have hoped for the possession of Louisiana, unless by the events of a war which would have cost ten times the purchase money.

the warlike nations of the earth by an ocean near a thousand leagues in breadth. Never since the commencement of the annals of mankind did any civilized nation possess so advantageous a position. Never was there a people who had their happiness so much in their own power. Far removed be the day, when in speaking of them it may be said,

*O fortunati, nimium, sua si bona norint!*

The advantages of these barriers, respectively, are incalculable. The object, or pretended object of almost all the wars which have distracted Europe for more than a century, has been the securing effective barriers for some, against the power, ambition, and encroachments of others. For this purpose, not only the most bloody wars have been waged, but peaceful and extensive dominions have been subjugated and divided between their more warlike neighbours, without the shadow of excuse, except the pretence of preserving the balance of power between themselves; or some other pretext equally frivolous and unjustifiable. When I think of these things, I am almost led to break out into strains of rapture and enthusiasm, which might seem inconsistent with the calm and dispassionate view that I have proposed to take of the subject before me.

Intimately connected with this view of the subject, is the *fifth* benefit which we may hope will be secured to the United States by the acquisition of Louisiana; which is, the preservation of the Union, among the present states, for a period far beyond that which it would probably have lasted if Louisiana had been retained and settled by France. For it is not improbable had a flourishing colony been established there, that means would have been adopted to seduce the people of the western states into an opinion that a more advantageous alliance, or confederacy could be formed with the possessors of that country, than with the United States. That a similarity of situation in respect to their com-

merce with the rest of the world must create a similarity of interests; for the promotion of which by vigorous and united measures, it would be advisable to separate from the Atlantic states, and form an union with each other, in that quarter. Even at this early day there have not been wanting characters, by whom these ideas of a western confederacy appear to have been cherished. If the proper use be made of our acquisition of Louisiana, such notions will not be revived for centuries; the United States will continue to find their interests the same, however diversified in appearance; they will discover that the moment of separation will commence the never ending period of their misfortunes.

Should these ideas be considered as merely Utopian, (which with a certain class of my readers is not improbable) there yet remain some other benefits which may probably result from the success of this negotiation, which may not be regarded altogether in so fantastical a light: one of these consists,

*Sixthly*; in having effectually secured ourselves against future rivalry in the sale of our lands on this side the Mississippi. Our western lands now command two dollars per acre, at the lowest. This price they will continue to command, unless, following the example of Virginia, we chuse to throw them away for an hundredth part of that sum. But, if France had settled Louisiana, it is probable that she would have offered her lands there on much lower terms. For having ten or twenty times as much land to dispose of as the United States, she could afford to undersell them, and by these means put a stop to the sale of our western lands, unless we should reduce the price to a level with what lands of equal quality might be had for there. In this competition we must have been entirely defeated, so that our present waste lands would have

remained in that state, but for this event, which has put the market completely in our own hands; and it will be our own faults if we do not avail ourselves of the benefit, which wisdom, discretion, and foresight are capable of deriving from so fortunate a circumstance.

*Seventhly*; a still more important consideration, inseparably connected with the last, is, that it secures us against the danger of depopulation, by migrations from these states to Louisiana; and furnishes us with the means of regulating our own population; besides giving us the exclusive benefit of emigrations from Europe.

Both these may be deemed objects of the first importance; if France had retained the possession of Louisiana, nothing is more likely, than that she would have adopted every measure for the promotion of that colony, which her well known skill in policy could have suggested. None was more obvious than offering to emigrants bounties in lands, and other advantageous terms of settlement, sufficiently captivating to allure many of the citizens of the United States to remove thither. Success in such a scheme would operate doubly to our disadvantage, since we should lose a citizen whenever they gained a new settler. A few years might have transferred the whole population on the east of the Mississippi to the western side of that river; for, those whom the spirit of adventure, or the desire of bettering their fortunes, might prompt to remove from the Atlantic to the *transmontane* states, would probably no longer stop there, but cross the Mississippi at once, in quest of better lands, or more advantageous terms of purchase, or of settlement. Emigrants from Europe would also have been probably tempted to look for settlements in this new land of promise, for the same alluring and substantial reasons. Thus not only the disposal of our *public lands*, but our population, itself, would have *been at the mercy* of the French government. It

would be inconsistent with every idea of sound policy in that government to suppose it would discountenance such an influx of inhabitants from the United States to Louisiana; or rather, we must suppose it utterly blind to the best interests of that colony, if the opportunity of thus advancing them should have been neglected.

The attainment of so many great and important objects, at the expence of little more than one year's revenue, must impress every man of reflection with a thorough conviction of the peculiar felicity of the United States, in thus securing the means of benefits which every moment must more fully develope, and which it depends upon ourselves, only, to perpetuate for ages. If, however, future events shall shew that we are not *satisfied with them*, from that period we may confidently pronounce, that if we had obtained Louisiana without paying a single cent for it, we should have made *a bad bargain!*

This reflection I have been induced to make as a prelude to the remarks I mean to offer upon one remaining advantage, which may eventually result from this acquisition, and which many of my readers may deem to be of the first magnitude, and importance; but which I am inclined to consider in a very different point of view: doubting, whether that of which they may think so highly, may not at first weaken, and then dissolve our present happy federal union, and finally subvert and destroy the happiness of this western world.

*Eighthly*, then; this immense territory may be regarded as a *treasure in bank*; the amount of which is at present altogether incalculable, and which must depend upon the progress of population, on the one hand, and on the other, upon the wisdom, moderation, energy, and firmness of our government, in resisting the allurements of an insidious and captivating policy, to which it may be urged by the solicitations of its false friends, and

the clamours of its open enemies, at the same time. In considering this part of the subject, I shall unavoidably be led to refer again to some things which I have already advanced: the reader, I hope, will pardon the repetition.

The first project that will be thought of by a certain class of men among us, probably will be the settlement of the new colony, and, for that purpose, the immediate opening of a *land-office* for the disposal of our newly acquired territory. It will be urged, plausibly enough, "that we ought to reimburse ourselves for the cost, by the immediate sale; that it is unreasonable to burthen the people of the United States with the payment of the purchase money, when so many persons may be found ready to take the lands at an advanced price, and even advance the amount of the original purchase, without calling upon the people at all, for that purpose; that we ought to encourage migrations from other countries, by offering the lands at a cheap rate to all that are willing to settle them." These arguments and perhaps an hundred others equally specious may seem perfectly convincing, and incline many to approve of a measure, which I apprehend would be attended with most pernicious effects, both immediate and consequential.

The author of the statistical table before referred to, calculates that there are now thirty-eight millions of acres of improved land within the United States, out of six hundred and forty millions which he supposes them to contain: if this estimate be correct (though I am inclined to think it much too high) there is upwards of fifteen times as much land lying waste within the United States, as there is of improved land. Now, if we suppose that there are not more than two-fifths, or two hundred and sixty millions of acres of the lands within the United States, unfit for cultivation, there will remain *three hundred and eighty millions of acres*, (or

ten times the present quantity of improved lands,) that are capable of it; and consequently there is land enough, even according to the present unprofitable mode of cultivation, for ten times the present number of inhabitants within the United States. Now, the value of land may be computed to encrease in a ratio at least equal to the population of a country; of course, it may be reasonably supposed, that whenever the United States arrive at their due state of population, the value of lands therein will be full ten times as great as at present. And if agriculture in the United States should ever be brought to as great perfection as in many parts of Europe, we may venture to affirm that both our population, and the price of our lands, would be advanced much higher than this estimate. But, if an equal quantity of lands as what the United States contain be brought into the market, those which we now possess must inevitably depreciate, instead of advancing daily in price, (as must happen in proportion as our population encreases) if no addition to the quantity at market be made; it will therefore be far more advantageous to the landholder to pay his quota of the annual interest upon the purchase of Louisiana, which he will probably never feel, than suffer the value of his lands to be depreciated, by opening a land-office in that immense territory, the consequences of which both he, and his posterity will be sure to feel. Upon this ground, then, it would be highly impolitic to dispose of the lands in Louisiana, at present.

But if it be still insisted upon, that the people of the United States ought not to be *taxed* to raise the money to pay for this acquisition, yet this will not prove the expediency of opening a land-office *there*.

For the United States have now probably fifty millions of acres of land to dispose of; and they are daily disposing of them at the price of two dollars per acre, for the lowest: seven millions and a half

of acres, sold at that price amounts to the principal sum to be paid for the purchase of Louisiana; and four hundred and fifty thousand acres, sold annually, will amount to the interest, which is all we are at present called upon to pay. If then we must sell lands to pay this interest, let us continue to sell those first, which are nearest home, and which will command the best price. By so doing we shall not depreciate the value of the remainder, as we shall if we begin with selling those at a distance, and at an inferior price. Besides, the interest of the United States requires that our population, already infinitely too much dispersed, should, instead of being rendered still more dispersed, become as compact as the fertility of our lands and other natural or accidental advantages will admit of.—Possessing already one hundred and twenty acres of land for every individual in the United States, would it not be folly in the extreme to invite any of them to remove beyond our present limits? Ought we not rather to encourage, to the utmost, population within the present states until there shall be people enough to cultivate and improve the whole? Then, and not till then, would it seem prudent to turn our attention to the settlement of a remote territory, whose advancement must, till that period, inevitably retard the settlement and improvement of the country which we already occupy.

If it be admitted that a dispersed population is a disadvantage to a state, (and surely it requires no argument to prove it) nothing can contribute more to such a dispersion than throwing into the market so immense a quantity of land. Every day's experience shews us that whenever new settlers, or purchasers of lands, are permitted to locate their purchases as they please, they make choice of the most fertile spots, only, neglecting the rest. Thus a very large portion of valuable land lies still waste *and uncultivated*;—whereas if new lands were only

granted when population requires it; and if one of the conditions of the grant were, that the grantee should make a permanent settlement thereon; all the lands in the country which are capable of cultivation and improvement would be settled, cultivated and improved : and population and the price of lands would be advanced accordingly. More especially if in addition to the condition of a permanent settlement upon the lands granted, no single grant should be made for more lands than might be sufficient for the occupation of one wealthy farmer. Let those who are disposed to set at nought these observations compare the state of agriculture and population in the New-England states with those of Virginia and North Carolina. In the former, barren spots are made productive, whilst in the latter vast tracts of arable lands lie wholly waste and uncultivated ; and five miles square in the first, can often produce as many hardy militia for the defence of their country, as five and twenty miles square can furnish in the latter. Invite the inhabitants of a compact township in Connecticut to disperse over an equal extent of country ; they would immediately find the difference in all the comforts and conveniences of life, domestic and political. Let them remove themselves into the howling wildernesses of Louisiana, and all the advantages which the United States might derive from their removal thither, would not recompense an hundredth part of the loss. And if the spirit of migration thither should seize the people of the New-England states generally, it might prove of fatal consequence not only to their agriculture, but to their commerce. For if once that hardy race of men who are now engaged in navigation in those states, should be allured by bounties in land, or by the cheapness of it, to turn their attention from the ocean to this new land of promise, it might change the face of their native country altogether ; and even their most flourishing commercial seaports

might be successfully rivalled by others more conveniently situated for an intercourse with the productive, and consuming parts of the United States. Nor does it require the spirit of prophecy to foresee that a rage for acquiring lands in Louisiana, and migrating thither to settle, if encouraged, must at no very distant period weaken and reduce the population in the Atlantic states, and not improbably all that lie eastward of the Mississippi. The consequences of such a seduction must prove ultimately fatal to the United States: for we may boldly pronounce, that, "*the CONFEDERACY can never be permanently extended beyond the MISSISSIPPI; nor preserved among its PRESENT MEMBERS, whenever LOUISIANA shall become a populous country.*" Whenever that event takes place the constellation of the present United States will probably set for ever.

Must we then never dispose of this immense quantity of valuable lands, which we have purchased at such a price? No:—Never, as long as the United States have lands to dispose of and settle on this side of the Mississippi; nor until we have a population more than equal to the cultivation of all our lands, to the best advantage.\* For until that period shall arrive there cannot be as much labour employed within the United States as may be advantageously employed therein; and so long as there is room for advantageous employment at home, it cannot be our interest to send abroad those who are necessary to the cultivation, improvement, and strengthening of our own country. That colonies are always expensive to the parent state in their first settlement, and that as soon as they acquire strength enough to help themselves they are unwilling to continue in subjection, our

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\* It is possible that there may be places on the banks of the western side of the river, that may be more favourable for vessels to stop at than any that can be found on the eastern side. My objections would not go to the exclusion of settlements at such places, provided they were limited to that object.

own recent conduct and experience fully shew. To colonise Louisiana would probably soon produce this effect; to extend the confederacy as far as to the limits of Mexico would probably produce a dissolution of the Union, and eventually change the type and character of our government. In proportion as we advance towards Mexico, we shall view its golden mines with the same cupidity that the Spaniards first beheld them; and this will no doubt lead to the nefarious project of conquering the Spanish dominions, first on this side, and then beyond the streights of Darien. To thousands among us such a project might even now appear as desirable as the original conquest of those countries did to the Spaniards. But, when we are willing to exchange our present constitutions and government, and our present enviable state of liberty, with all its attendant blessings, for the riches and the wretchedness of Spain, we shall deserve all the miseries which such an achievement would entail upon us, and our posterity, forever.

But, if these dissuatives, powerful as they appear to my mind, be not sufficient to deter us from opening a land office in Louisiana, let us view the subject in another light. The terms upon which those lands must be granted must be comparatively high, or low. If high, those who are disposed to purchase lands will prefer them on this side of the Mississippi, and will consequently not purchase *there*; if low, the lands which the United States now have for sale will remain unsold. Thus no advantage, either way, can possibly result from the measure.—If the lands be sold in large tracts they may be acquired and held by persons who do not owe allegiance to the United States.—or, the foundations of future principalities may be laid by successful speculators. If in small parcels laid out into townships (as the lands north-west of the Ohio) it will only serve to allure those to settle *beyond* the limits of the United States, who would settle *within* them, if the temptation be withheld. Thus in no

possible view can I perceive any benefit likely to result to the United States by opening a land office in Louisiana, whilst a thousand mischiefs threaten to flow from any attempt of the kind.

But, when the population of the United States shall render it no longer wise, or practicable, to restrain emigrations from them, then this immense treasure in bank may be called up from the vault in which, until that time, it will be adviseable to keep it locked up; and, wonderful to behold! then shall we find that our talent has increased to ten talents, without merchandising with it, or lending it out at usury.—But to this period, he that values the happiness of the United States can only look forward with a sigh, at the painful reflection, that the price of all this treasure will be the present unrivalled happiness of his country.

As some atonement for these unfashionable Utopian ideas, I shall proceed to consider another advantage which may possibly accrue to the United States from this acquisition, if a proper use be made of it: that is,

*Nintbly*; we now shall have it in our power to propose to the Indian nations now settled within the United States an exchange of lands beyond the Mississippi, for those which they now hold\*; by this means we shall be able to dispose of all the lands on this side the Mississippi to those who will cultivate them, who are already civilized, who speak the same language with us, and who will be ready and willing to harmonize and become one people with us, if they be not so already. The lands which we may acquire in this manner will probably be amply sufficient to pay for ten times the purchase of Louisiana. and this remote treasure, so dangerous to be touched whilst it remains at a distance, may be brought with safety to our doors, and

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\* There are probably two hundred millions of acres of land in the United States to which the Indian title has not yet been extinguished.

used as occasion shall require, without fear of the consequences.

Such an exchange, if it can be effected, of which I presume there can be little doubt, will strengthen and cement our union beyond any other event of which I am able to form an idea. Our whole country, except the ports on the Atlantic, and at the mouth of the Mississippi, will consist of an extensive and numerous agricultural people, detached from all the other civilized nations of the globe, forming one general and powerful confederacy of republican states, nursed in the lap of liberty, sprung from one common stock, cherishing the same fraternal sentiments towards each other, and the same devotion to their common country, liberty and happiness. The demon of discord is the only enemy from whose effects or malignity the United States could have just cause of apprehension; and he might be chained for centuries, beyond the Mississippi, if the policy which is here recommended be adopted.

Of the same nature, though of less practicable aspect, is another Utopian idea, which I presume to suggest to the genuine friends of freedom, yet, I confess, without any sanguine hope, that it will receive countenance. The southern parts of Louisiana bordering upon the gulph of Mexico lie under a climate more favourable for the African constitution than any part of the United States. Thither, if under the auspices of a divine Providence, the great work of the abolition of slavery should be accomplished in Virginia, or other southern states, we may colonize those unhappy people, whom our ancestors have brought in chains from their native country, and we continue to hold in bondage. Would to God, that I could flatter myself that this was not a mere visionary project!—Thither, at least, it may be adviseable to entice those to remove who have already, or may hereafter obtain their freedom, through the benevolence of their

masters, and a relaxation of the rigid laws, which have heretofore existed to prevent emancipation. Thither, also, delinquents, whose lives may be forfeited to the considerations of self-preservation, may be banished for attempts to regain their native freedom. The distance of that part of Louisiana from the United States might recommend it as a place of exile, also for other criminals.—There they might form settlements, and perhaps repent, and become useful members of society among each other: but I am not more sanguine upon this subject, than the former. Time and experiment may enable us to judge better.

It formed no part of my plan in this essay to consider what temporary arrangements it might be necessary to adopt on this truly important occasion: many will no doubt be necessary.—But if what I have offered against the settlement of Louisiana be worthy of attention, I would beg leave to hint, that a measure intimately connected with those already mentioned, would be to invite those, who are now settled in Louisiana, to remove into the United States, by proposing to them an advantageous exchange of lands. Thus should we make them a full recompense for whatever they might abandon on the other side of the Mississippi, and gain an accession of population in the United States, and at the same time relieve ourselves from any expence necessary for the preservation of civil government among them. This, if it can be effected, will be a happy counterpart of the proposed exchange with the Indian tribes.

The island of New-Orleans will no doubt claim the immediate attention of Congress. If we can obtain from Spain a cession of that part of West Florida which lies to the west of the Mobile, or even of the Pearl river, or of the river Amitie, it *might be* worthy of an amendment of the constitution to incorporate that territory, together with the territory of New-Orleans, with the present

United States government upon the Mississippi ; and admit the whole into the Union as a new state, as soon as the population of it may entitle it to such admission. Such an arrangement would probably immediately conciliate the affections of the people of the ceded territory, and prove an additional motive to those beyond the Mississippi to remove to this side, where they might at once experience all the benefits of civil government, and the participation of the freest and happiest constitution upon the face of the globe.

Homer tells us that Ulysses on his return from Troy paid a visit to Eolus, the God of the winds ; who, out of his great favor to that illustrious chief presented him with a bag, in which all the adverse winds and storms, which might retard or endanger his passage to his native kingdom, were tied up : his companions, fancying that this bag contained some precious *treasure*, took the first opportunity, whilst the Ithacan sage was asleep, to *open it* ;—upon which, the winds and storms instantly making their escape, the ship with all his indiscreet companions was immediately swallowed up in the ocean.

May no imprudent use of our late successful negotiation with France induce the application of this fable to the people of the United States!

*August 10, 1803.*

THE END.

